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INTRODUCTION

The Eighth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States·
contains three clauses designed to protect citizens from the government's power to prosecute: the prohibition of Excessive Bail, Excessive. Fines, and Cruel and Unusual Punishment. 2 The Eighth
Amendment, although historically applied to criminal prosecutions
and "direct actions initiated by government to inflict punishment,"3
has recently been held to apply in the civil arena as well. In Austin
v. United States,4 the Supreme Court of the United States concluded
that "forfeiture generally and statutory in rem forfeiture in particular
historically have been understood, at least in part, as punishment."5
Accordingly, the Court held that modern statutory forfeiture,6 pursuant to the commission of drug offenses, constituted punishment
and was subject to the limitations of the Excessive Fines Clause of
the Eighth Amendment. 7
The Court of Appeals of Maryland addressed the issue of
constitutional limitations on civil in rem forfeiture, for the first time,
in Aravanis v. Somerset County.s In Aravanis, the court found that
1. The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides: "Excessive
bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual
plIDishments inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
2. Id.; see also Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S.
257, 266 (1989).
3. Browning-Ferris, 492 U.S. at 260.
4. 509 U.S. 602 (1993).
5. Id. at 618.
6. The Court in Austin was concerned with 21 U.S.C. §§ 881(a)(4) & (a)(7) (1988
& SUpp. V 1993) which provide for the forfeiture of:
(4) All conveyances, including aircraft, vehicles, or vessels, which are
used, or intended for use, to transport, or in any manner to facilitate
the transportation, sale, receipt, possession, or concealment of [controlled substances, their raw materials, and equipment used in their
manufacture and distribution] ....

(7) All real property, including any right, title, and interest (including
any leasehold interest) in the whole of any lot or tract of land and
any appurtenances or improvements, which is used, or intended to be
used, in any manner or part, to commit, or to facilitate the commission
of, a violation of this subchapter punishable by more than one year's
imprisonment, except that no property shall be forfeited under this
paragraph, to the extent of an interest in an owner, by reason of any
act or omission established by that owner to have been committed or
omitted without the knowledge or consent of that owner.
21 U.S.C. §§ 881(a)(4) & (a)(7) (1988 & Supp. V 1993); see also Austin, 509
U.S. at 622.
7. See Austin, 509 U.S. at 622.
8. 339 Md. 644, 651, 664 A.2d 888, 891 (1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 916
(1996).
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9
Maryland's forfeiture statute was similar to the statute at issue in
Austin, and therefore, punitive in nature. lO Accordingly, Maryland's
high court concluded that civil in rem forfeiture constituted punishment. II The court did not, however, reach the issue of the applicability
of the Eighth Amendment to the state forfeiture action. 12 Rather,
recognizing that Article 25 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights l3
has long been considered in pari materia with the Eighth Amendment,
it held that the excessive fines provision of article 25 was dispositive
of the case sub judice. 14 While setting forth broad parameters, the
court did not articulate "a precise formula or laundry list of factors"
to be considered in determining whether a particular forfeiture violates article 25. IS Rather, the court felt it prudent to allow trial judges
to determine the appropriate factors to be weighed, on a case-bycase basis, and remanded the instant case back to the trial court for
a determination of whether the forfeiture was constitutionally excessive. 16
By not clearly defining a test to determine whether or not a fine
is excessive, Maryland will undoubtedly join the myriad of jurisdictions fending for themselves. Such a lack of direction from the high
1996]

9. The statute involved in Aravanis was Article 27, Section 297(m) of the Annotated Code of Maryland which provides in relevant part:
(m) Forfeiture of interest in real property. - (1)(i) Except as provided
in subsection (I) [innocent owner defense] of this section and paragraph
(2) of this subsection [principal family residence owned tenants by the
entirety, may not be forfeited unless both parties are convicted], an
owner's interest in real propeity may be forfeited if the real property
was used in connection with a violation of § 286, § 286A, § 286B, §
286C, or § 290 of this article in relation to these offenses.
MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 297(m) (1996); see also Aravanis, 339 Md. at 654,
664 A.2d at 893.
10. See Aravanis, 339 Md. at 655, 664 A.2d at 893.
11. See id.
12. See id. at 655-56, 664 A.2d at 893.
13. Article 25 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights provides "[t]hat excessive
bail ought not to be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel or unusual
punishment inflicted, by the Courts of Law." MD. CODE ANN., CONST. art.
25 (1981).
14. See Aravanis, 339 Md. at 654-56, 664 A.2d at 893-94. Article 25 was based
on the English Bill of Rights of 1689. See id. at 656, 664 A.2d at 894 (citing
Walker v. State, 53 Md. App. 171, 183, 452 A.2d 1234, 1240 (1980) (citing
Phipps v. State, 39 Md. App. 206, 211, 385 A.2d 90, 93-94 (1978))). Article
25 served as a model for the Eighth Amendment. See Browning-Ferris Indus.,
Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257,264 n.5 (1989). Thus, the Excessive
Fines Clause of Article 25 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights is textually
identical to the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution. See
Aravanis, 339 Md. at 656, 664 A.2d at 893-94. Article 25 is considered to be
in pari materia with the Eighth Amendment. See id. at 894.
15. Id at 665, 664 A.2d at 898.
16. See id. at 666, 664 A.2d at 898-99.
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courts has resulted in a loss of uniformity among United States
circuit courts17 and courts of the several states. 18 The lack of uniformity has resulted from the failure of the highest courts to articulate
definitive methods and factors to be considered in determining "excessiveness.' '19
This note will examine the court of appeals's decision in Aravanis
by first tracing the historical purpose and modern developments of
civil in rem forfeiture, with deliberate emphasis on Maryland state
law. It will then address the impact of determining civil in rem
forfeitures to be punitive, especially in light of protections provided
by the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment. 20
17. See infra notes 92, 94, and accompanying text.
18. See, e.g., In re 2120 S. 4th Ave., 870 P.2d 417 (Az. 1994) (holding that Eighth
Amendment Excessive Fines Clause does not apply to civil in rem drug
forfeitures because such forfeitures are remedial in nature and do not constitute
punishment); Thorpe v. State, 450 S.E.2d 416 (Ga. 1994) (adopting test from
United States v. 6625 Zumirez Dr., 845 F. Supp. 725 (C.D. Cal. 1994»; Evans
v. State, 458 S.E.2d 859 (Ga. App. 1995) (following test promulgated in
Zumirez, 845 F. Supp at 725-42); Cade v. Lot 2 in Block 5 of Vista Village
Addition, 885 P .2d 381 (Idaho 1994) (finding civil in rem forfeiture to be
punishment and hence subject to the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth
Amendment; remanding to trial court for determination of excessiveness without
formulating a test); Waller v. 1989 Ford F350 Truck, 642 N.E.2d 460 (Ill.
1994) (adopting Zumirez test); State v. Hellis, 536 N.W.2d 587 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1995) (holding that protection under Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth
Amendment is only triggered when forfeiture is disproportionate to the offense
committed); State v. $7000, 642 A.2d 967 (N.J. 1994) (failing to reach constitutional question of excessiveness; stating only that a direct causal connection
must exist between the property and the crime); State v. Hill, 635 N.E.2d 1248
(Ohio 1994) (holding Excessive Fines Clause of Eighth Amendment and Ohio
constitution apply to civil in rem drug forfeiture; failing promulgate a test);
In re King Properties, 635 A.2d 128 (Pa. 1993) (adopting instrumentality test
and expressly rejecting proportionality test and requiring instead that forfeited
property be used significantly in the commission of the offense; stating that a
significant relationship between the property and the offense is only evidenced
by a pattern of similar incidents); State v. 392 S. 600 E., 886 P.2d 534 (Utah
1994) (holding instrumentality is threshold test: state must prove substantial
nexus between property and crime and state must establish a pattern of illegal
activities occurring at the property; holding further that once instrumentality
is established proportionality review may be appropriate; failing, however, to
define proportionality).
19. See supra note 18 and infra notes 92, 94.
20. The Fifth Amendment provides:
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous
crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except
in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in
actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any person
be subject for the same offen[s]e to be twice put in jeopardy of life
or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without

1996]
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HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT

A.

The History of Civil In Rem Forfeiture
A forfeiture is a penalty by which one loses rights, title, and
interest in property in consequence of a default or an offense. 21
Three types of forfeiture were established in England at the time
Maryland's article 25 and the Eighth Amendment were ratified: (1)
deodand; (2) statutory forfeiture; and (3) forfeiture following conviction for a felony or treasonP Deodands were forfeitures to the
Crown following the accidental death of a King's subject, in an
amount equal to the value of the inanimate object that directly, or
indirectly, was responsible for the loss of life. 23 Statutory forfeiture,
provided for the forfeiture of objects used in violation of custom
and revenue laws.24 The third type was commonly known as forfeiture
of estate. 25 Following a property owner's conviction of a felony or
of treason, all of his real and personal property were forfeited to
the Crown.26 Statutory forfeiture 27 became a part of the American
scheme of justice 28 and can be either criminal or civil in nature.
Criminal forfeiture is analogous to forfeitures of estate, while civil
in rem forfeiture has been characterized as a merger of deodand and
statutory forfeiture.2 9
Criminal forfeiture statutes were enacted to punish criminal
defendants following conviction of a requisite criminal offense. 30

21.
22.
23.

24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public
use, without just compensation.
U.S. CONST. amend .. V.
See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 650 (6th ed. 1990).
See Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 680-83 (1974).
See Robert Lieske, Civil Forfeiture Law: Replacing the Common Law With a
Common Sense Application of the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth
Amendment, 21 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 265, 273 (1995). For example, a wagon
wheel falls off the back of a lorry and strikes a child on the side of the road,
causing her death. The owner of the wheel would be required to pay, to the
crown, the monetary value of the wheel, which was the instrumentality of the
child's death. Cj. id. at 273-75.
See Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 682.
See id.
See id.
Forfeitures are not favored in the law and must be authorized by a specific
statute. See United States v. One 1976 Ford F-150 Pickup, 769 F.2d 525, 527
(8th Cir. 1985); see also 37 C.J.S. Forfeitures § 5(a) (1943).
See Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 682.
See id.
See Libretti v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 356, 363 (1995). Criminal forfeiture
statutes currently punish criminal conduct in violation of federal racketeering
and drug laws. See id.; see also Gozlon-Peretz v. United States, 498 U.S. 395,
399-403 (1991) (tracing the statutory history of the Comprehensive Crime
Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, Tit. II, 98 Stat. 1976, which
instituted criminal forfeiture for violations of federal law).
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Such forfeitures are considered sanctions and are imposed upon
criminal defendants as part of their sentences. 31 The proceeding is
considered in personam, as it is a direct punishment against an
individual for criminal conduct.32 The excessiveness analysis for in
personam criminal forfeitures centers on the amount of the forfeiture
in relation to the severity of the offense. 33
Conversely, civil in rem forfeitures are based on the premise
that "the thing is primarily considered the offender. "34 Thus, in rem
proceedings are brought directly against the offensive propertY,3S the
focus being on the property's guilt, rather than on the guilt of the
property's owner.36 This often led to harsh results when a property
owner, innocent of wrongdoing, lost title to "tainted" propertyY
The harshness of civil in rem forfeiture has been abrogated, in
modern times, by statutory provisiong38 and constitutional safe-

31. See Libretti, 116 S. Ct. at 363.
32. See Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 624 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring);
see also William J. Hughes & Edward H. O'Connell, Jr., In Personam

(Criminal) Forfeiture and Federal Drug Felonies: An Expansion of a Harsh
English Tradition into a Modern Dilemma, 11 PEPP. L. REv. 613, 618 (1984).
33. See Austin, 509 U.S. at 627 (citing Alexander v. United States, 509 U.S. 544,
571-74 (1993». Alexander was a criminal forfeiture action decided on the same
day as Austin. See Alexander, 509 U.S. at 559 n.4. In Alexander, the defendant

34.

35.
36.

37.
38.

contended that the taking of his 31 wholesale and retail businesses and
$9,000,000 in cash was excessive because his conviction was based only on the
seizure of seven obscene materials. See id. at 547-48, 558. The Court found
that the Excessive Fines Clause did apply to the criminal forfeiture. See id. at
559. On remand, however, the Supreme Court urged the Eighth Circuit to
evaluate the excessiveness of the taking not on the number of materials found,
but on the temporal and criminal extent of the defendant's racketeering
enterprise. See id. The Court's emphasis in criminal (in personam) forfeiture,
therefore, is clearly on the culpability of the property's owner, and not that
of the property.
Goldsmith-Grant Co. v. United States, 254 U.S. 505, 510 (1921).
See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 793 (6th ed. 1990).
See, e.g., Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 683
(1974) (permitting forfeiture of a yacht, upon which a single marijuana cigarette
was found, despite the innocence of the yacht's owner); Goldsmith-Grant, 254
U.S. at 510 (permitting forfeiture of automobile used in liquor tax avoidance
scheme, despite the use of the automobile without the permission or knowledge
of the owner); United States v. Harmony, 43 U.S. 210 (1844) (permitting
forfeiture of a cargo vessel used in acts of piracy on the high seas, despite
owner's lack of culpability, but permitting the innocent owner of the vessel to
retain the cargo contained therein, because the cargo was not guilty of an
offense).
See supra note 36 and infra note 38.
See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 881 (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (requiring government to
show that there is (1) probable cause that property was used, or intended to
be used, to facilitate illegal drug activity; and (2) owner of property has
opportunity to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the owner had

Aravanis v. Somerset County
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guards. Innocent owners of property that was used to further illegal
purposes can now implement an innocent owner defense, as permitted
by statute. 4O Moreover, the application of constitutional analysis
affords the owner of seized property an additional means of regaining
title to "guilty" property41 if the owner can show that the taking of
the owner's property is "excessive." If the taking is deemed excessive,
then the forfeiture will be considered unconstitutional and the property will remain titled to the owner. 42
1996]

39

1.

The Federal Scheme of Civil In Rem Forfeiture

Civil in rem forfeiture has been part of the American legal
landscape since the American Revolution and was utilized during our
country's infancy to remedy crimes such as piracy 43 as well as to
enforce protective tariffs on luxury goodsW and tobacco imports. 4s
During the 1920s, it was used to combat bootleggers seeking to
circumvent the prohibition of alcohol.46 Currently, civil in rem forfeiture is used to assail illegal gambling,47 the sexual exploitation of

39.
40.
41.

42.

43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

no culpability with regards to the drug activity); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, §
2fJ7 (1996) (permitting grant of remission of forfeiture to protect the rights of
innocent parties and prohibiting forfeiture of family home, held in tenancy by
the entireties, unless both parties have been convicted of offenses expressed in
the statute). It must be noted, however, that such protections are not available
for property that is the direct proceeds of criminal activity. See 21 U.S.C.
881(a)(6) (1988 & Supp. V 1995). Extending such protections to "fruits" of
criminal activity would, in effect, reward the felon for criminal acts and permit
illegally gotten gains to be shielded from forfeiture actions. See United States
v. Alexander, 32 F.3d 1231, 1236 (8th Cir. 1994). The Eighth Circuit succinctly
explained, "Forfeiture of proceeds cannot be considered punishment, and thus,
subject to the excessive fines clause, as it slmply parts the owner from the
fruits of the criminal activity." Id.
See Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602 (1993) (holding Eighth Amendment
Excessive Fines Clause applicable to civil in rem forfeiture).
See supra notes 36, 38.
For purposes of this discussion, the property at issue will be assumed to have
been used, or intended to be used, in the facilitation of a statutorily prohibited
activity, as opposed to contraband or property directly traceable as proceeds
of illegal activity. See supra notes 36, 38.
See United States v. Shelly's Riverside Heights Lot X, 851 F. Supp. 633 (M.D.
Pa. 1994) (finding forfeiture of family farm and residence used to manufacture
marijuana for personal consumption excessive in relation to the criminal
offense). See infra notes 269-72 and accompanying text.
See Harmony v. United States, 43 U.S. 210 (1844).
See Peisch v. Ware, 8 U.S. 347 (1808).
See Lilienthal's Tobacco v. United States, 97 U.S. 237 (1877).
See Goldsmith-Grant Co. v. United States, 254 U.S. 505 (1921).
See 18 U.S.C. § 1955(d) (1994).
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children,48 money laundering,49 organized crime, 50 and illegal drug
trafficking.51
An examination of the mechanics of civil in rem forfeiture reveals
why it has historically been favored by law enforcement. To commence civil in rem proceedings, prosecutors need only prove that
there is probable cause to believe that the property was used in the
commission or facilitation of a crimeY The property is then "pun48. See 18 U .S.C. § 2254 (1994).
49. See 18 U .S.C. § 981 (1994).
SO. See The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18
U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 (1994).
51. See 21 U.S.C. § 881 (1994); see also supra note 6.
52. At the federal level, the initial burden of proof in attaching property for trial,
in civil forfeiture actions, falls on the government to show probable cause that
the property was· connected to a drug crime. See United States v. Milbrand,
58 F.3d 841, 844 (2d Cir. 1995); United States v. Rural Route 1, Box 137-B,
24 F.3d 845, 848 (6th Cir. 1994); United States v. RR # 1, Box 224, 14 F.3d
864, 869 (3d Cir. 1994); United States v. Shelly's Riverside Heights Lot X, 851
F. Supp. 633, 637 (M.D. Pa. 1994). The burden then shifts, in the majority
of the circuits, to the claimant to show, by a preponderance of the evidence,
that the property is not subject to forfeiture. See Milbrand, 58 F.3d at 844.
But see United States v. 6380 Little Canyon Rd., 59 F.3d 974, 985 (9th Cir.
1995) (placing the burden on the government to show a substantial connection
between the property and the offense, once a claimant asserts that forfeiture
violates the Excessive Fines Clause). Although the Maryland courts have not
yet reached this specific issue, two recently decided cases indicate that their
approach will probably be more analogous to the majority method.
In 1986 Mercedes Benz 560 CE v. State, 334 Md. 264, 279, 638 A.2d
1164, 1171 (1994), the Court of Appeals of Maryland addressed burdens of
proof following the assertion of an innocent owner defense. In its analysis,
the court stated that once adequate evidence is presented that property is
subject to forfeiture under section 297 a presumption of forfeitability arises.
See 1986 Mercedes Benz 560 CE, 334 Md. at 279, 638 A.2d at 1171. The
burden then shifts to the claimant to rebut the presumption by a preponderance
of the evidence. See id.; see also State v. One 1984 Toyota Truck, 311 Md.
171, 183, 533 A.2d 659, 665 (1987) (holding the innocent owner defense
provided for within section 297 is an affirmative defense and the burden is on
the owner to show ·"entitlement to exemption").
This approach was applied in One Ford Motor Vehicle v. State, 104 Md.
App. 744, 657 A.2d 825 (1995). The issue before the Court of Special Appeals
of Maryland concerned determining ownership of a motor vehicle seized by
the police following a drug arrest. See id. at 751-53, 657 A.2d at 828-29. The
automobile was not titled to the drug offender, but rather was held in his
sister's name. See id. at 750, 657 A.2d at 828. The court recognized that there
W& a presumption that the named title holder was the owner of the property,
but that the state had rebutted that presumption. See id. The appellate court
considered the ownership issue a question of fact properly left for the trier of
fact to determine. See id. In support of the trial judge's decision, the appellate
court noted that the drug offender possessed both sets of the car's keys and
exercised complete control over the vehicle. See id. at 748, 657 A.2d at 827.
Further, the court stated that the "claimant hard] the burden of proving the

1996]

Aravanis v. Somerset County

163

ished" through seizure, and the secondary punitive effect on the
owner of the property is not considered relevant. S3 The civil nature
of the proceeding affords prosecutors a lower burden of proof,s4
while it deprives property owners the protections guaranteed to
criminal defendants under the Bill of Rights of the United States
Constitution. ss
The owners of "offensive" property, in modern times, have
been afforded some protection by the enactment of "innocent owner"
defenses.s6 Constitutional protections, such as due process constraints
on law enforcement officials, S7 have also strengthened the position
of claimants. The Supreme Court's decision in Austin, that the Eighth
Amendment protection against excessive fines is available in civil in
rem proceedings, adds another layer of protection heretofore unavailable.sa
a.

The History of Title 21 U.S.C. Section 881

The forfeiture statute at issue in Austin was originally enacted
as The Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of
1970. s9 The Act authorized the federal government to seize cars,
equipment, and other instrumentalities used to manufacture or transport illegal drugs.60 In 1978, the Act was amended to include a

53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

58.
59.
60.

claimant [was] an 'innocent owner.'" Id. at 753, 674 A.2d at 829 (citing One
Toyota Truck, 311 Md. at 183-84, 533 A.2d at 664-65). The court stated that
"if an innocent owner can satisfy the court that he/she has an interest in the
property, it should not be forfeited." Id. at 751, 657 A.2d at 829. Thus, the
burden of proof rests on the party asserting ownership of the property to
prove that the party is innocent of the underlying offense and are the rightful
owner of the property.
The assertion of a constitutionally excessive fine, if successful, provides a
remedy to the claimant analogous to the remedy afforded by the innocent
owner defense. See supra notes 36-38. It is reasonable to assume, therefore,
that the procedure for proving this constitutional claim will, likewise, mirror
that of the innocent owner defense.
See Steven V. Miller, So What Rights Does A HMET Mobile Home Have
Anyway? In Austin v. United States, the Supreme Court Applies the Excessive
Fines Clause to In Rem Civil Forfeitures, 23 CAP. U. L. REv. 797 (1994).
See Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 608 n.4 (1993) (citing In re Winship,
3fJ7 U.S. 358 (1970».
See Miller, supra note 53, at 797.
See supra notes 36-38.
See United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property, 114 S. Ct. 492 (1993);
see also United States v. Lasanta, 978 F.2d 1300 (2d Cir. 1992) (holding Fourth
Amendment's prohibition of unreasonable search and seizure applies to civil
in rem forfeiture).
Austin, 509 U.S. at 622.
21 U.S.C. § 881 (1994).
See ide
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provision that would subject profits earned from illegal drug activity
to forfeiture. 61 Congress again broadened the reach of law enforcement with the enactment of The Comprehensive Crime Control Act
of 198462 allowing the seizure of real property used in the commission
or facilitation of drug activity, 63 as well as providing an innocent
owner defense provision.64
2.

The Maryland Scheme of Civil In Rem Forfeiture

Maryland's drug forfeiture statute predates the federal statute
by some twenty years. 65 In its original form,66 the Maryland statute
allowed for forfeiture of conveyances of illegal drugs and also
contained an innocent owner provision. 67 The statute in force at this
61. See 21 U .S.C. 881(a)(6) (1994); see also S. Rep. No. 225 (1984), reprinted in
1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3374 (stating that for efforts against drug trafficking
to be successful, the economic benefits of the drug trade must be attacked),
62. 21 U.S.C. § 881 (1994).
63. See 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7) (1994).
64. See id.
65. The Uniform Narcotic Drug Act was enacted by Chapter 59 of the Laws of
1935 by the Maryland State Legislature. In 1951, Senate Bill 406 was unanimously passed by the Maryland State legislature and became Chapter 471 of
the Laws of 1951. Senate Bill 406 added a new section, codified at MD. ANN.
CODE art. 27, §§ 276-305, to the Uniform Narcotic Drug Act allowing for
forfeiture of "tainted" property.
66. The relevant section in the case at bar is MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 297 (1996).
The predecessor to § 297 was codified at MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 301 and
stated:
In addition to any other fines or penalties provided for a violation
of provisions of this subtitle, any motor vehicle, vessel or aircraft
used or employed in the concealment, conveying or transporting of
any such narcotic drugs, or used during the course of any violation
of this subtitle by any person or persons convicted of the same shall
upon the conviction or convictions be declared by the court to be
forfeited to the county or to Baltimore City, as the cac;e may be;
provided that no vehicle be forfeited hereunder un/~ the owner
thereof authorized or permitted such use or employment .... "
Art. 27, § 301 (emphasis added).
67. See supra note 66. The operation of this affirmative defense, however, was
negated in 1970 by the repeal of the original statute and enactment of the
Maryland Controlled Dangerous Substance Act, which did not provide innocent
owners with protection from forfeiture of "tainted" property. On July 1, 1970,
Chapter 403 of the Laws of 1970 took effect, repealing sections 276-313D of
article 27 and substituting sections 276-302 under the new subheading, "HealthControlled Dangerous Substances." See Prince George's County v. One 1969
Opel, 267 Md. 491, 495, 298 A.2d 168, 170 (1973). Specifically, section 297
was substituted for section 301. See id. This change in Maryland's statutory
scheme was recognized by the Court of Appeals of Maryland in Prince George's
County v. Blue Bird Cab Co., 263 Md. 655, 658-59, 284 A.2d 203, 204-05
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writing is essentially the same as the federal statute. It provides for
the forfeiture of conveyances and real property used to facilitate
drug transactions, as well as providing for the forfeiture of the
proceeds of illegal drug activity. 69
.
68

B.

The Prohibition Against Excessive Fines
The recent decisions in Aravanis v. Somerset County7° and Austin
v. United States 71 establish a protection to property owner's beyond

that which is provided by statute - a guarantee that such forfeitures
not be unconstitutionally excessive.
1.

The Eighth Amendment Prohibition Against Excessive Fines
The Eighth Amendmenf2 was adopted to control abuses of the
federal government's prosecutorial power. 73 The debate surrounding

68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

73.

(1971), where the court acknowledged the legal fiction that an inanimate object
can be guilty of a crime. It further recognized that the historic treatment of
forfeiture followed the ancient law of deodand. See id. Additionally, it noted
that the statute in force prior to July 1, 1970 "was contrary to the general
view." Id. at 659, 284 A.2d at 205. Finally, the court held that while the
taking of "tainted" property from an innocent owner was harsh, it was not
constitutionally barred. See id. at 662, 284 A.2d at 206.
In 1972, however, a narrow innocent owner defense was adopted by the
legislature. See State v. One 1983 Chevrolet Van Serial No. IGCCG15D8D
104615, 309 Md. 327, 330-31, 524 A.2d 51, 52-53 (1987). This exception dealt
primarily with automobiles but did not require return of the property to the
lienholder. Rather, they permitted the state to sell the automobile, deduct their
expenses from the proceeds, and apply the balance to the lien.
In 1984, the statute was again amended to provide additional protection
to lienholders. See id. at 331-32, 524 A.2d at 53. A new subsection was enacted
which required that: "No conveyance shall be forfeited under the provisions
of this section to the extent of the interest of any owner of the conveyance
who neither knew or should have known that the conveyance was used or was
to be used in violation of this subtitle." Art. 27, § 297(a)(4)(iii). This new
subsection was subsequently construed to afford a broad innocent owner
defense. See State v. One 1984 Toyota Truck, 311 Md. 171, 182-84, 533 A.2d
659, 664-65 (1987). The statute in force at this writing expressly provides
protection to innocent owners of tainted property. Subsection (c) states: "Property not subject to forfeiture. - Property or an interest in property described
under subsection (b)(4) , (9), and (10) of this section may not be forfeited if
the owner establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that the violation of
this subheading was done without the owner's actual knowledge." § 279(c).
See MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, §297(m) (1996).
See id.
339 Md. 644, 664 A.2d 888 (1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 916 (1996).
5(9 U.S. 602 (1993).
See supra note 1 for the text of the Eighth Amendment.
See Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc. V. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 260
(1989).
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the adoption of the amendment was minimal and the Excessive Fines
Clause received "even less attention.' >74 This lack of attention continued into modern times because the Supreme Court did not address
the application of the Excessive Fines Clause until its 1989 decision
in Browning-Ferris Industries, Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc. 75 In holding the Excessive Fines Clause inapplicable to disputes between private
parties, the Court stated that the clause "was intended to limit only
those fines directly imposed by, and payable to, the government. "76
While the Browning-Ferris Court acknowledged that the Eighth
Amendment had long been understood to apply exclusively to criminal cases,77 it declined to hold that the Excessive Fines Clause was
solely applicable to the criminal arena.78
The Court revisited this issue in Austin, and held that the
Excessive Fines Clause was a limitation on civil in rem forfeiture
imposed for the commission of drug offenses. 79 The Court's application of Eighth Amendment protection to the civil arena was based
on its determination that civil in rem forfeiture had historically been
understood to constitute governmentally imposed punishment. 80 In
reaching this conclusion, the Court recognized that civil in rem
forfeiture deprives property owners of their property rights as a
deterrent and as punishment for criminal activity, 81 Further, the Court
noted that the existence of innocent owner provisions revealed that
the true focus of civil in rem forfeiture was on the culpability of the
owner and that Congress intended only to punish those guilty of
criminal activity,82 Determining that the drug forfeiture statutes at
issue83 constituted punishment, the Court noted that they tied forfeiture to an underlying drug offens~ and that the legislative history
of the statute indicated congressional intent to use forfeiture as a
deterrent. 85 The Austin Court concluded that in the presence of these
. factors, forfeiture, under the statutes at issue, "constitute[d] 'payment to a sovereign as punishment for some offense,"'86 and was,
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

Id. at 264.
Sex! id.
Id at 268.
See id. at 262.
See id. at 265.
See Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 622 (1993); see also supra note 6.
See Austin, 509 U.S. at 618; see also supra notes 21-58 and accompanying
text.
See Austin, 509 U.S. at 618.
See id. at 619.
See 21 U.S.C. §§ 881(a)(4) & (a)(7) (1994); see also supra note 6.
See Austin, 509 U.S. at 620.
Sex! id.
Id at 622 (quoting Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492
U.S. 257, 265 (1989».
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therefore, "subject to the limitations of the Eighth Amendment's
Excessive Fines Clause. "87
Q.

Tests jor Excessiveness

While holding that the Eighth Amendment applied to civil in
rem forfeiture, the Austin Court declined to fashion- a test for
determining excessiveness. 88 Justice Scalia, in a lone concurring opinion, articulated a test that has been termed the "instrumentality
test. "89 In remanding Austin for a determination of excessiveness,
the Court did not, however, limit the lower court from considering
factors other than Justice Scalia's proposed instrumentality test. 90
Because of the lack of direction given by the majority, federal district
and circuit courts have developed their own tests.91 While these tests
are far from uniform, they tend to emphasize either an "instrumentality" or a "proportionality" approach. A minority of federal
circuits have fashioned tests based on Justice Scalia's instrumentality
proposal which focus on the connection between the property and
the underlying drug offense. 92 The majority of federal circuits, however, have given great weight to the Austin Court's failure to adopt
Justice Scalia's test.93 These circuits have fashioned tests that require
the value of forfeited property to be proportional to the underlying
criminal activity. 94
87.Id
88. S~ id.
89. S~ id. at 623-28.
90. See id. "Justice Scalia suggests that the sole measure of an in rem forfeiture's
excessiveness is the relationship between the forfeited property and the offense .... We do not rule out the possibility that the connection between the
property and the offense may be relevant, but our decision today in no way
limits the Court of Appeals from considering other factors in determining ...
excessiveness." Id. at 623 n.15.
91. See infra notes 92, 94 and accompanying text.
92. Three circuits have adopted the instrumentality test: the Ninth Circuit, United
States v. 6380 Little Canyon Rd., 59 F.3d 974 (9th Cir. 1995), the Seventh
Circuit, United States v. Plescia, 48 F.3d 1452 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S.
Ct. 114 (1995), and the Fourth Circuit, United States v. Chandler, 36 F.3d
358 (4th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1792 (1995). See also infra notes
139-44 and accompanying text (discussing 6380 Little Canyon Rd.), notes 99104 and accompanying text (discussing Plescia), notes 108-34 and accompanying
text (discussing Chandler).
93. See supra note 90.
94. Five circuits have followed this approach. See United States v. Milbrand, 58
F.3d 841 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding factors to be considered include: harshness
of forfeiture in comparison to gravity of offense and sentence that could have
been imposed; relationship between the property and the offense; and role and
degree of culpability of the owner of the property), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct.
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The Instrumentality Test

The threshold question of the instrumentality test, as announced
by Justice Scalia, is whether there is a close enough relationship
between the property and the offense "to render the property, under
traditional standards, 'guilty' and hence forfeitable."9s Thus, in
determining excessiveness, federal courts are considered to have
adopted an instrumentality test if the test's threshold factor focuses
on the nexus between the property and the offense.96
The extent of the connection required, however, varies from
circuit to circuit. 97 Several circuits also· require that other factors be
considered once a substantial nexus between the offense and the
property has been established.98 The only uniformity between the
various instrumentality tests is that the instrumentality requirement
is the threshold factor to be considered in determining excessiveness.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit is
the sole jurisdiction, to date, to apply an absolute instrumentality
test. 99 In United States v. Plescial oo the government seized a defen-

95.
96.
97.

98.
99.
100.

1284 (1996); United States v. Rural Route I, Box 137-B, 24 F.3d 845 (6th Cir.
1994) (holding petitioner must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that
forfeiture is grossly disproportionate to offense committed); United States v.
Myers, 21 F.3d 826 (8th Cir. 1994) (adopting proportionality analysis requiring
a fact specific evaluation of all the circumstances of defendant's criminal
conduct, including the extent of criminal drug activities, in order to determine
excessiveness), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 742 (1995); United States v. 18755 N.
Bay Rd., 13 F.3d 1493 (11th Cir. 1994) (adopting proportionality analysis measure seriousness of offense by examining whether illegal conduct, associated
with the property, was the type Congress intended to punish); United States
v. Sarbello, 985 F.2d 716 (3d Cir. 1993) (holding defendant required to make
prima facie showing that forfeiture is not grossly disproportionate); United
States v. 429 S. Main St., 843 F. Supp. 337 (S.D. Ohio 1993) (holding primary
factor to consider is gravity of offense, measured by harmful reach of crime
and sentence allowable under statute, as compared to the value of the forfeiture;
other factors may include extent of property's use and whether family home),
ajf'd in part, remanded on other grounds, 52 F.3d 1416 (6th Cir. 1995); see
also infra notes 262-68 and accompanying text.
Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 628 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring).
See supra note 92.
Compare United States v. 6380 Little Canyon Rd., 59 F.3d 974, 985 (9th Cir.
1994) (requiring a substantial connection between the property and the underlying offense) with United States v. Plescia, 48 F.3d 1452, 1462 (7th Cir. 1995)
(holding forfeiture is appropriate if used in any way to facilitate drug offenses
as long as the use is not "incidental or fortuitous") (citing United States v.
916 Douglas Ave., 903 F.2d 490, 493 (7th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct.
114 (1995».
See notes 92-143 and accompanying text.
See United States v. Plescia, 48 F.3d 1452, 1462 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 116
S. Ct. 114 (1995).
Id
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dant's home on the basis of one phone call between codefendants,
the purpose of which was to set up a large cocaine transaction. lOl
The court found that the forfeiture was not excessive because the
property was deliberately, as opposed to fortuitously, used to facilitate a drug transaction. I02 Expressly adopting Justice Scalia's instrumentality analysis, 103 the court found that the connection between
the property and the offense was close enough to warrant forfeiture
regardless of the value of the property.l04
The Fourth and Ninth Circuits apply a multi-tiered instrumentality approach. lOS The Fourth Circuit analysis expressly rejects the
applicability of proportionality analysis,l06 yet allows additional factors to be considered once a nexus between the property and the
offense has been established. Conversely, the Ninth Circuit employs
a proportionality analysis, but only if a substantial nexus has been
established between the property and the underlying criminal activity.l07 Thus, both are considered instrumentality tests because of their
nexus requirement, and both employ a multi-tiered approach because
they apply other factors to determine excessiveness once the nexus is
satisfied.
The instrumentality test was adopted by the United States Court
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit as the "appropriate standard for
determining excessiveness" in United States v. Chandler. lOS In Chandler, evidence was presented at the forfeiture proceeding that a thirtythree acre farm, valued at $569,000, was the situs of at least 130
drug transactions. 109 There was also testimony that farm employees
were paid for their labors in drugs rather than in cash. 11O The trial
court found probable cause that the property facilitated the drug
activity and was thus subject to forfeiture. 111 The burden of proof
then shifted to the claimant to show either that the property was not
used as a site for drug transactions, or that the owner was unaware
of the illegal activity.1I2 The jury found that the property was used
to facilitate drug activity, that it was improved by proceeds of the
drug exchanges, and that the property owner was aware of the drug
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

See id.
See id.
See supra notes 89-90 and accompanying text.
See Plescia, 48 F.3d at 1462.
See infra notes 106-44 and accompanying text.
See United States v. Chandler, 36 F.3d 358, 360 (4th Cir. 1994).
See United States v. 6380 Little Canyon Rd., 59 F.3d 974 (9th Cir. 1994); see
also supra notes 139-44 and accompanying text.
36 F.3d 358, 360 (4th Cir. 1994).
See id. at 360, 366.
See id. at 361.
See id.
See id.
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dealings. 113 The entire farm was ordered forfeited, and the owner
appealed on the grounds that the forfeiture was excessive. 114
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit first established the appropriate
standard by which to ascertain whether or not a forfeiture violates
the Excessive Fines Clause. I1S In promulgating its test the court
recognized the historical premise that in rem forfeiture is grounded
on the legal fiction that the "property itself was considered the
'offender."'116 Further, the court found that the drug forfeiture
statute at issue 117 "did not intend to punish or fine by a particular
amount or value; instead, it intended to punish by forfeiting property
of whatever value which was tainted by the offense."118 Thus, the
Chandler court held that the central question of excessiveness is the
role of the property and the extent of its use in the furtherance of
the underlying offense. 119
The focus of the Chandler test is on the property and its role
in the offense. l20 The factor given the greatest weight, the nexus
between the property and the offense, is determined by considering
several specific factors, none of which are dispositive: (1) whether
the property's use was deliberate; (2) whether the property's use was
important to the success of the crime; (3) the time during which the
property was used and the spatial extent of its use; (4) whether the
use was an isolated incident or the property has been used more
than once; and (5) whether the property was acquired, maintained,
or used with the purpose of carrying out the crime. 121
The court recognized, however, that civil in rem forfeiture exacts
a punishment on the owner of the property. 122 Acknowledging the
punitive aspect of such forfeitures, the court provided that the role
of the property owner, while of "minor relevance," should also be
considered. 123 "Thus, where the owner's involvement in the offense
is only incidental, as opposed to extensive - e.g., where he is simply

1l3.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

See id.
See id. at 361-62.
See id. at 363.
Id.
See 21 U.S.C. § 881 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
Chandler, 36 F.3d at 364. Although the Chandler court acknowledged that
forfeiture exacted punishment on the property owner, it dismissed both the
value of the property and the gravity of the underlying offense as factors to
be weighed in an excessiveness analysis. See id. The value of the property and
the gravity of the offense are factors often employed under the proportionality
test. See infra notes 145-84 and accompanying text.
See Chandler, 36 F.3d at 364.
See id.
Sei id. at 365.
See id. at 364.
See id.
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aware of the offense but not a perpetrator or conspirator
this
fact will weigh on the excessiveness side of the scales. "124 This element
operates to mitigate the harshness of forfeiture if the property owner
can show that his role in the underlying criminal activity was minimal.
The court was also concerned that only "tainted" property be
subject to forfeiture. 125 The Chandler court provided that if the
property owner could prove that readily separable parcels were not
implicated in the underlying offense, they could be saved from
forfeiture. 126 The burden of proving separability, however, rested
with the property owner. 127
The Fourth Circuit then applied the above factors to the facts
presented at trial. l28 The court found that the secluded nature of the
property was important to the success of the illegal activity.129 Furthermore, the number of transactions that occurred on the property
and the extensive use of the property for drug storage increased the
culpability of the property.l3° The court also found that the property
was partially maintained and improved by payments to farm workers
made with drugs. 131 Thus, the requisite nexus between the property
and the drug activity was overwhelmingly satisfied.132 Turning to the
remaining two factors, the court was unpersuaded that the property
owner's role was incidental. The court also noted that no evidence
was presented that the property was separable. 133 Thus, the court
concluded that the entire thirty-three acre farm had been properly
forfeited and that the excessive fines clause was not offended. 134
The Chandler test is a two-tiered approach to civil in rem
forfeiture actions. First, the establishment of the requisite nexus
between the property and the offense determines whether a forfeiture
can properly be imposed. 135 Second, the extent of the property
owner's involvement and the separability of the offending property
are factors that relate directly to the excessiveness of the "fine. "136
Hence, where property is clearly implicated through its use in criminal
activity, its forfeiture may be excessive if the owner can prove that
the owner's role is "incidental, as opposed to extensive" or if
1996]

124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.

Id.
See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See

id.
id.
id. at 366.
id.
id.
id.
id.
id.
id.
id.
id. at 364.
id.
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"nonimplicated" property is not separated, where possible, from
offending property. 137 This analysis is less harsh than the Plescia
test.138 Its multi-factored approach affords more protection to the
property owner as it considers the extent of the property's use and
role of the owner in the underlying criminal activity in its determination of excessiveness.
A slightly different two-tiered approach was adopted by the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in United States
v. 6380 Little Canyon Road. 139 To determine whether the forfeiture
is proper, the Ninth Circuit applies the instrumentality test which
requires the government to show a substantial connection between
the gUilty property and the underlying criminal offense. l40 Once the
government has satisfied its burden, the court applies a proportionality prong as "a check on the instrumentality approach." 141 Thus,
once the instrumentality requirement is satisfied the "worth of the
property must be 'proportional' (not excessive) to the culpability of
the owner."142 Under this model, property that is extensively used
for criminal purposes may be saved from forfeiture if the court
determines that the harshness of the forfeiture l43 exceeds the culpability of the owner .144
ii.

The Multi-Factor Proportionality Test

The multi-factor proportionality approach recognizes both the
in personam and in rem characteristics of civil in rem forfeiture.
This approach stems from analogizing the Supreme Court's treatment

137. Id.
138. See supra notes 99-104 and accompanying text.
139. 59 F.3d 974, 982 (9th Cir. 1994).
140. See id. at 985. This approach of shifting the burden of proof to the nonclaiming party differs from the rest of the circuits which have addressed this
issue. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
141. 6380 Little Canyon Rd., 59 F.3d at 983. The proportionality prong is applied
in recognition of the potential harshness of civil in rem forfeiture. See id.
142. Id. at 982.
143. The Ninth Circuit considered the following factors in determining the harshness
of the forfeiture: (1) the fair market value of the property; (2) the subjective
value of the property (whether it is the family home, etc.); and (3) the hardship
to the claimant, taking into account the effect of the forfeiture on the claimant's
family or financial condition. See id. at 985.
144. The culpability of the owner is determined by considering the following factors:
(1) whether the owner was reckless or negligent in allowing the property to be
used for criminal activity; (2) whether the owner was directly involved in the
criminal activity and the extent of the involvement; and (3) the harm caused
by the illegal activity measured by the amount of drugs involved, the duration
of the activity, and the effect of the crime on the community. See id. at 986.
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of parallel clauses contained in the Eighth Amendment. 145 The approach utilized in determining violations of the Eighth Amendment, 146
in regard to the Excessive Bail and Cruel and Unusual Punishment
Clauses,147 forms the basis for the proportionality test. 148 Recognizing
that there are "parallel limitations" imposed "on bail, fines and
other punishments,' '149 courts have synthesized and applied the Supreme Court's treatment of the Excessive Bail l50 and Cruel and
Unusual PunishmentlSI Clauses to the Excessive Fines Clause. 152 While
the actual tests adopted by the various courts are far from uniform, 153
the element common to all is the requirement that the moral gravity
of the offense be weighed against the harshness of the forfeiture. 154
145. See Douglas S. Reinhart. Applying the Eighth Amendment to Civil Forfeiture
After Austin v. United States: Excessiveness and Proportionality. 36 WM. &
MARY L. REv. 235. 252-53 (1994) (noting that analysis of the Excessive Fines
Clause should be similar to that required by the Excessive Bail Clause and the
Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause).
146. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII; see also supra note 1 for the text of the Eighth
Amendment.
147. See supra note 1.
148. See Reinhart. supra note 145. at 264.
149. Solem v. Helm. 463 U.S. 277. 289 (1983).
150. "[f)he Excessive Fines Clause should be read to employ a proportionality
standard as does the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Excessive Bail
Clause. in which the Court reads 'excessive' to require proportionality between
the amount of bail and the 'interest the Government seeks to protect,' i.e .•
the risk of flight." United States v. 6380 Little Canyon Rd .• 59 F.3d 974. 983
(9th Cir. 1995) (quoting United States v. Salerno. 481 U.S. 739. 754 (1987);
Stack v. Boyle. 342 U.S. 1. 5 (1951».
.
151. "[f)he mode for determining whether a fine is 'excessive' would be similar or
virtually identical to that employed to determine whether a punishment was
'cruel [and) unusual ... • United States v. Sarbello. 985 F.2d 716. 725 n.16 (3d
Cir. 1993).
152. See United States v. 11869 Westshore Dr.. 70 F.3d 923. 927-28 (6th Cir. 1995)
(tracing the evolution of the proportionality test).
153. See infra notes 155. 156. 259. 272 and accompanying text.
154. See infra notes 155. 156. 259. 272 and accompanying text. This element can
be traced to the Supreme Court's holding in Solem v. Helm. 463 U.S. 277.
303 (1983). In Solem. the Court defined the limitation of the Eighth Amendment's Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause. See id. The defendant had been
convicted of six prior nonviolent felonies when he was convicted of "uttering
a 'no account'" check in the amount of $100. Id. at 281. The Court found
that the sentence imposed pursuant to a recidivist statute. life in prison without
the opportunity of parole. was "grossly disproportionate" and violated the
Eighth Amendment. Id. at 288. 302. In order to clarify what was meant by
grossly disproportionate. the Court established a three factor proportionality
analysis: (1) the gravity of the offense and the harshness of the penalty; (2)
sentences imposed on other criminals in the same jurisdiction; and (3) sentences
imposed for the same crime in other jurisdictions. See id. at 292. It is the first
of these factors that has almost uniformly been applied in determination of
whether a forfeiture is proportionately excessive. See, e.g.• United States v.
11869 Westshore Dr .• 70 F.3d 923. 927-28 (6th Cir. 1995).
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Additional factors commonly employed quantify the gravity of the
underlying criminal involvement ISS and the harshness of the forfeiture ls6
as they relate to the property ownerlS7 and the extent and nature of
the property's use. IS8
Representative of the proportionality approach is the test put
forth in United States v. 6625 Zumirez Drive. IS9 In Zumirez, the
Government sought forfeiture of a single family home, valued in
excess of $600,000, from which $15,200 of cocaine had been seized. l60
The owner of the property had been acquitted of criminal charges;
however, his son, 'an occupant of the home, had been found guilty
of numerous drug offenses. 161 Seeking forfeiture, the Government
alleged that the owner permitted his son to use the property for
illegal drug activity. 162
The Zumirez court adopted a -three factor proportionality test
balancing: (1) whether the inherent gravity of the offense outweighed
the harshness of the penalty; (2) whether the property was an integral
part of the commission of the crime; and (3) whether the criminal
activity involving the property was extensive in terms of time and
spatial use. 163 The focus of the first factor is on the conduct of the
claimant, while the focus of the second and third factors is on the
instrumentality of the property. 164

155. See, e.g., United States v. 18755 N. Bay Rd. 13 F.3d 1493, 1498-99 (llth Cir.
1994) (measuring seriousness of offense by examining whether underlying illegal
conduct was type Congress intended to punish); United States v. Shelly's
Riverside Heights Lot X, 851 F. Supp. 633, 638 (M.D. Pa. 1994) (measuring
gravity of the crime by its harmful reach and benefits accrued through illegal
activity); United States v; 429 S. Main St., 843 F. Supp. 337, 341-42 (S.D.
Ohio 1993) (measuring gravity of the offense by harmful reach of the crime
and sentence allowable under the corresponding criminal statute), a/I'd in part,
remanded on other grounds, 52 F.3d 1416 (6th Cir. 1995).
156. See, e.g., Shelly's Riverside Heights Lot X, 851 F. Supp. at 638 (measuring
harshness by significance of the seized asset to the claimant); 429 S. Main St.,
843 F. Supp. at 341-42 (requiring harshness to take into account whether
property seized is a family home).
157. The emphasis on the owner of the property makes the in rem analysis more
akin to the analysis undertaken for in personam forfeiture. See supra notes
32-33 and accompanying text.
158. The extent of the property's use relates directly to its instrumentality. See
United States v. Zumirez, 845 F. Supp. 725, 732 (C.D. Cal. 1994).
159. 845 F. Supp. at 725-42. The Zumirez court expressly rejected the "Solem
approach," yet expressly incorporated the first element of the Solem test. See
id at 731-32.
160. See id. at 730.
161. See id.
162. See id.
163. See id. at 732.
164. See id. at 733-34.
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The application of the first factor requires a two step analysis.
First, the inherent gravity of the claimant's conduct is evaluated
based on whether the claimant was convicted of the criminal act
underlying the forfeiture, the claimant was never charged with any
crime, or the claimant was charged and acquitted of the underlying
criminal offense. 165 When the property owner has not been convicted
of the underlying offense, "the court must be careful to focus only
on the inherent gravity of the offensive conduct engaged in by the
claimant himself, rather than on the inherent gravity of the offense
or offenses that the government had probable cause to believe were
committed on the property. "166 Second, the harshness of the forfeiture is evaluated by considering the monetary value of the interest
held in the property, as well as such intangibles as the type l67 and
characterl68 of the property. 169
The second factor is derived from the traditional treatment of
civil in rem forfeiture. 170 The relevant inquiry is whether the property
has a close enough relationship to the underlying offense to render
it guilty, and hence, forfeitable. 17I Finally, the application of the
third factor involves a determination of the spatial extent of the
property's use, and "whether the defendant property played an
extensive or pervasive role in the commission of the crime."172
The Zumirez court applied the above factors to the forfeiture
action and held that it was excessive.173 The court noted that the
property owner had been charged and acquitted of the underlying
drug offense. 174 Focusing its inquiry on the owner's offensive behavior, the court found that the lack of direct involvement in the drug
activity and the familial relationship between the offender and the
owner significantly reduced the gravity of the owner's acts. 175 In
evaluating the harshness of the forfeiture, the court recognized that

165. See ide at 733.
166. Id.
167. The Zumirez court noted that society places a higher value on real versus
personal property. See ide at 734.
168. The Zumirez court specifically mentioned the increased value society places on
the home as opposed to personal property. See ide (citing United States v.
James Daniel Good, 114 S. Ct. 492, 505 (1993); Payton v. New York, 445
U.S. 573, 601 (1980».
169. See ide
170. See ide
171. See id.; see also supra notes 89-90 and accompanying text.
172. Zumirez, 845 F. Supp. at 734. The court found that the analysis for this factor
should follow that used by the Supreme Court in Alexander v. United States,
500 U.S. 544, 559 (1993). See supra note 33.
173. See Zumirez, 845 F. Supp. at 742.
174. See ide at 735.
175. See ide at 736.
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the loss of a horne, owned and maintained for over twenty years,
was "unquestionably ... severe," especially in light of the owner's
acquittal. I76 The court concluded that the forfeiture of the home
"greatly exceed[ed] that which would be appropriate in light of the
offensive behavior involved." 177
Further, the court found that the property's only link to the
criminal activity was its use as a site for drug sales. 178 The location
of the home did not facilitate the drug activity, nor did it "provide
a cloak of legitimacy to the illegal drug traffickers who frequented
the house." 179 Without more of a connection, the court declined to
find that the property was integral to the commission of a crime,
and the horne was deemed not to be an instrument of illegal activity. 180
Thus, forfeiture of the property would not further the goal of ridding
society of the instrumentalities of drug activity.
As to the spatial and temporal use of the property, the court
found the government's evidence relating to the time frame during
which the property was used to be sparse. 181 The extent of the use,
however, was substantial as drugs were found in five bedrooms and
an exterior shed.182 The court emphasized that this was the only
factor of the proportionality test that was satisfied. 183 Taking all the
factors into consideration, the court held that forfeiture of the
property would violate the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth
Amendment. l84
The proportionality approach differs significantly from the instrumentality approach. The central focus of the proportionality test
is on the behavior of the owner of the property with only secondary
consideration given to the property's role in the criminal activity. 185
This is in sharp contrast to the instrumentality test which emphasizes
the role of the property and only looks to the owner's lack of
culpability as a limiting factor .186
2.

Maryland's Prohibition Against Excessive Fines
Prior to Aravanis v. Somerset County,187 Maryland's high court
had never applied the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amend176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.

[d. at 737.
[d.

See id. at 738.
[d. at 737.
See id. at 738.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See supra notes 145-84 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 95-144 and accompanying text.
339 Md. 644, 664 A.2d 888 (1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 916 (1996).
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ment or article 25 to a civil in rem forfeiture. Indeed, the Eighth
Amendment Excessive Fines Clause was only peripherally188 applied
by the Court of Appeals of Maryland in Randall Book Corp. v.
State. 189
Randall Book Corp. involved the imposition of 116 separate
fines, totalling $58,000, arising out of obscenity law infractions.l90
The defendant corporation challenged these fines as a "claim of an
illegal sentence." 191 Accordingly, the court analyzed the fines under
a framework loosely based on that employed in cruel and unusual
punishment challenges. 192 The court recognized, however, that the
penalties imposed on the defendant were fines. 193
In reaching its decision, the court undertook a proportionality
analysis comparing the aggregate fine imposed, with the gravity of
the offense. l94 Recognizing that the defendant corporation had a
history of similar enforcement action and profited from the sales of
such materials, and that the fines were below the statutory maximum
permitted by the legislature, the court concluded that the fines did
not constitute "excessive fine[s] ... within the meaning of the Eighth
Amendment. " 195
III.

THE INSTANT CASE
In 1971, George Joseph Aravanis (Aravanis), appellant, and his
wife, took title, as tenants by the entireties, to a Maryland farm.l96
They used this property as their family home until their separation. l97
Aravanis continued to occupy the property, as originally titled, until
1991 when part of the property was sold.198 Following this sale,
Aravanis took sole title to the remaining house and land as his share
of the proceeds, receiving $16,000, a portion of which was used to
purchase marijuana for distribution purposes. l99
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.

193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.

See id. at 657 n.l0, 664 A.2d at 894 n.1O (1995).
316 Md. 315, 332, 558 A.2d 715, 724 (1989).
See id. at 319, 558 A.2d at 717.
Id. at 322, 558 A.2d at 719.
See id. at 331, 558 A.2d at 723. The court expressly referred to Solem v.
Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983), but declined to apply the full test to the facts of
the case. Randall Book Corp., 316 Md. at 330, 558 A.2d at 723. For a
discussion of the Solem test see supra note 154.
See Randall Book Corp., 316 Md. at 319, 329-32, 559 A.2d at 717, 722-24.
See id. at 330-31, 559 A.2d at 723.
Id at 332, 559 A.2d at 724.
Aravanis v. Somerset County, 339 Md. 644, 646, 664 A.2d 888, 889 (1995),
cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 916 (1996). The farm was located at 5341 Shelltown
Road in Westover, Somerset County, Maryland. See id.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 646-47, 664 A.2d at 889.
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In July of 1991, a search and seizure warrant was executed on
Aravanis's property and approximately two pounds of marijuana and
several items commonly used in the drug trade were seized.200 Prior
to the search, it was established that Aravanis gave a large quantity
of marijuana to a family member, had sold large quantities of
marijuana to two individuals on at least three occasions, and had
made two controlled sales of marijuana, from the residence, during
the weeks just prior to the search. 201 Aravanis pled guilty to one
count of possession of a controlled dangerous substance pursuant to
Section 286 of Article 27 of the Annotated Code of Maryland. 202
Thereafter, the forfeiture proceeding at issue was filed by the State. 203
Prosecutors sought forfeiture of Aravanis's farm pursuant to
Maryland's drug forfeiture statute:204 The State argued that because
the property was used in connection with his underlying drug offense, lOS it was subject to forfeiture.206 Aravanis maintained that the
forfeiture of his home was excessive for two months of drug dealing.207 The trial court, however, found that the property had been
200. See id. The paraphernalia seized included sandwich baggies and a set of triple
beam scales. See id.
201. See id. at 647 n.3, 664 A.2d at 889 n.3.
202. See id. at 647, 664 A.2d at 889. Section 286 of Article 27 of the Annotated

203.
204.
205.

206.

207.

Code of Maryland states, in relevant part:
Unlawful manufacture, distribution, etc.; counterfeiting, etc.; manufacture, possession, etc., of certain equipment for illegal use; keeping
common nuisance. (a) Except as authorized by this subheading, it is
unlawful for any person: (1) to manufacture, distribute, or dispense,
or to possess a controlled dangerous substance in sufficient quantity
to reasonably indicate under all circumstances an intent to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, a controlled dangerous substance.
MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 286 (1996).
See Aravanis, 339 Md. at 648, 664 A.2d at 890.
See id. at 649, 664 A.2d at 890 (citing § 297); see also supra notes 9, 65-67
and accompanying text.
Aravanis "pled guilty to one count of possession of a controlled dangerous
substance in sufficient quantity to indicate an intent to manufacture, distribute,
or dispense pursuant to Article 27, § 286." Aravanis, 339 Md. at 647, 664
A.2d at 889; see also supra note 202.
See Aravanis, 339 Md. at 649, 664 A.2d at 890.
See id. at 650, 664 A.2d at 891. Aravanis also argued, unsuccessfully, that
pursuant to section 297(1) of article 27: (1) the state had failed to establish, by
clear and convincing evidence, that the property had been purchased during
the time of his illegal activity; and (2) the state had failed to establish that
there was no other fiscal source for the acquisition of the property. See id. at
648, 664 A.2d at 890. The trial court concurred with the State that the forfeiture
was controlled by section 297(m), and that section 297(1) was inapplicable. See
id. at 649-50, 664 A.2d at 890. The Court of Appeals of Maryland, recognized
that section 297(1) is only invoked when there are questions as to the actual
owner of the property. See id. at 649 n.8, 664 A.2d at 890 n.8. Accordingly,
a rebuttable presumption was established that property owned by an individual
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used in connection with the distribution of marijuana and, therefore,
satisfied the requirements of the forfeiture statute.2OS Finding that no
exceptions to the statute were met, the trial court ordered the property
forfeited to the State. 209 Aravanis filed an appeal to the Court of
Special Appeals of Maryland; however, prior to consideration by
that court, the Court of Appeals of Maryland granted certiorari on
its own motion.21D
Aravanis challenged the forfeiture of his home on constitutional
grounds, claiming that the taking of his property was excessive in violation of the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment
of the United States Constitution and Article 25 of the Maryland
Declaration of Rights.211 Aravanis based his Eighth Amendment
challenge on the Supreme Court's holding in Austin v. United States2 12
and asserted that the Eighth Amendment is applicable to the states
through the Fourteenth Amendment. 213

A.

The Application oj Austin
The Aravanis court followed the model set forth in Austin214 by

first determining if the drug forfeiture statute at issue, article 27
section 297(m),2IS constituted punishment.216 These factors include:
(1) whether the statute has historically been understood to punish;217
(2) whether an innocent owner provision is included within the
statute;218 (3) whether the statute at issue tied forfeiture to a statutorily
proscribed drug offense;219 and (4) whether the legislative history of

208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.

214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.

who has violated the relevant drug statutes are proceeds of criminal activity.
Upon the State's showing, by clear and convincing evidence, that the property
was acquired while engaged in illegal drug activity and there was no other
likely source for such property, the property is forfeitable. See id. at 649 n.6,
664 A.2d at 890 n.6 (citing § 297(1). Maryland's high court did not dispute
the trial court's findings with respect to Aravanis's section 297(1) claim, and
turned its attention to Aravanis's constitutional claim. See id. at 651, 664 A.2d
at 891.
See id. at 650, 664 A.2d at 891.
See id.
See id. at 651, 664 A.2d at 891.
See id.; see also supra notes 1 and 13.
5<9 U.S. 602 (1993).
See Aravanis, 339 Md. at 650, 664 A.2d at 891. Stating that article 25 is in
pari materia with the Eighth Amendment, Aravanis maintained that in the
eventuality that Maryland's high court did not find the Eighth Amendment
applicable, article 25's prohibition of excessive fines must be applied. See id.
See supra notes 79-87 and accompanying text.
See supra note 9.
See Aravanis, 339 Md. at 651-55, 664 A.2d at 891-93.
See Austin 509 U.S. at 618.
See id.
See supra note 6.
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the statute indicated legislative intent that forfeiture serve as a
deterrent. 220 The presence of these factors in the forfeiture statute at·
issue would "constitute 'payment to a sovereign as punishment for
some offense," '221 and would, therefore, be subject to constitutional
limitations. 222
The Aravanis court held that although section 297 is a civil
action in rem, it is the type of statute that has "'historically been
understood, at least in part, to [punishJ."'223 The court also observed
that section 297(m), like the forfeiture statutes at issue in Austin,224
contains an innocent owner defense. 22s Moreover, the court found
that the third element of tying the forfeiture to a drug offense was
satisfied because section 297 expressly refers to various illegal drug
activities that trigger the statute. 226 Finally, the Aravanis court noted
that the state legislature intended the statute to serve as a deterrence
to drug actlvity.227 Thus, having satisfied the elements set forth in
Austin, the court held that section 297, and subsection (m) in
particular, were punitive in nature. 228
The Aravanis court then set forth broad parameters under which
civil in rem forfeitures should be evaluated for excessiveness. 229
Maryland's high court adopted a hybrid test for excessiveness230
incorporating both an "instrumentality test"231 and a "proportionality test." 232 The court did not, however, propose that its analysis
be a "precise formula.' '233 Rather, the court deferred to the trial
judges to determine "the weighing of factors appropriate to each
individual case." 234
In determining the factors for the instrumentality prong, the
court examined the Fourth Circuit's decision in Chandler. 235 The
Aravanis court found the Chandler test to be "a forceful and well
220. See Austin, 509 U.S. at 619-20.
22l. Id. at 622 (quoting Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S.
257, 265 (1989».
222. See id.
223. Aravanis v. Somerset County, 339 Md. 644, 652, 664 A.2d 888, 892 (1995)
(quoting Austin, 509 U.S. at 612), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 916 (1996).
224. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 881(a)(4) & (a)(7); see also supra note 6.
225. See Aravanis, 339 Md. at 654, 664 A.2d at 893.
226. See id. at 655, 664 A.2d at 893.
227. See id.
228. See id.
229. See id. at 657-65, 664 A.2d at 894-98.
230. See id. at 665, 664 A.2d at 898.
23l. See supra notes 95-144 and accompanying text.
232. See supra notes 145-84 and accompanying text.
233. See Aravanis, 339 Md. at 665, 664 A.2d at 898.
234. Id at 666, 664 A.2d at 899.
235. 36 F.3d 358 (4th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1792 (1995); see also
supra notes 108-38 and accompanying text.
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articulated defense of the instrumentality test''236 and determined that
the Chandler test provides a "sound basis for evaluating the relationship between the property and the illegal activity. "237
Additionally, the Aravanis court mandated that the property
owner's culpability, regarding the underlying offense, also be considered in determining excessiveness.238 The court noted that the plain
meaning of "excessive," coupled with the determination that civil
forfeiture is punishment for an offense, required that excessiveness
analysis focus on the owner of the property. 239 The court maintained
that failure to inquire into the effect of the forfeiture on the owner
conflates the constitutional excessive fines analysis with the statute's
nexus requirement and ignores that forfeiture has, as its object, some
person.240 According to the Court of Appeals of Maryland, "[i]t is
appropriate, therefore, that the owner's culpability with respect to
the underlying criminal activity be considered." 241
In its proportionality analysis, the court examined, but fell short
of adopting, the test set forth in Zumirez.242 Rather, the court
identified a "non-exclusive" 243 list of factors to be considered: the
enormity of the loss to the owner; the gravity, scope, and duration
of the illegal activity; and the culpability of the owner.244 Additionally, the state may show the profit gleaned from the illegal activity
"because that fact bears on the question of how much the owner
actually loses by the forfeiture." 245 The court did not intend, however,
to limit the lower courts to this list of factors.246 Rather, the court
deliberately reserved the identification and weighing of the relevant
factors to the discretion of the trial court. 247
Thus, the Aravanis court laid out a loose framework under
which excessive fine analysis is to be applied.248 Instrumentality is to
be determined under the factors of the Chandler test. 249 Trial courts

236.
237.
238.
239.

240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.

248.
249.

Aruvanis, 339 Md. at 661, 664 A.2d at 896.
Id. at 665, 664 A.2d at 898.
Sa! id. at 664, 664 A.2d at 898.
See id.
See id. at 664-65, 664 A.2d at 898 (citing United States v. 9638 Chicago
Heights, 27 F.3d 327, 330 (8th Cir. 1994».
Id. at 664, 664 A.2d at 898.
See id. at 662-64, 664 A.2d at 897-98; see a/so supra notes 159-84 and
accompanying text.
See Aravanis, 339 Md. at 666, 664 A.2d at 898.
See id. at 665, 664 A.2d at 898.
Id. at 665 n.16, 664 A.2d at 898 n.16. The court stated that such profits may
be shown directly, or indirectly. See id.
Sa! id. at 665, 664 A.2d at 898.
See id. at 665-66, 664 A.2d at 898-99.
Sa! id.
Sa! id. at 665, 664 A.2d at 898.
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are also required to consider' 'factors of proportionality that compare
the gravity of the offense . . . with the enormity of the loss to the
owner occasioned by the forfeiture. "250 The court did not undertake
any further analysis. Rather, it remanded the case to the trial court
for a determination of whether the forfeiture at bar violated the
Excessive Fines Clause of article 25. 251 Therefore, as the Supreme
Court had in Austin, the Maryland high court held that civil in rem
forfeiture was subject to the protections of excessiveness analysis,
yet refused to apply a test to the instant case or even to definitively
promulgate a test.
IV . ANALYSIS
The Aravanis court established broad guidelines for Maryland
lower courts. 252 It did not, however, apply any of the factors it laid
out to the facts of the case. The court's failure to endorse, and
apply, a specific test may lead to confusion and non uniformity.
Additionally, the court's determination that section 297 is punitive
may invoke the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment to
the United States ·ConstitutiOIY53 because convicted felons who are
subjected to forfeiture proceedings may assert they are being punished
twice for the same offense. 254

A.

Aravanis Did Not Provide a Clear Test of Excessiveness
The Supreme Court's failure to define a test for excessiveness
in Austin has engendered much confusion in the lower federal and
state courts.2SS This confusion may well be repeated in Maryland.
Had the Aravanis court dealt directly with the merits of the case, or
more definitively supported a set test, such a result could have been
avoided.
Maryland's high court endorsed, but failed to clearly define the
role of the Fourth Circuit's Chandler test. 256 Is it a threshold determination, or is it just one factor to be considered under a totality
of the circumstances? Further, confusion may reign as lower courts
are forced to grapple with defining, weighing, and applying a host
of proportionality factors to civil in rem forfeitures.
250. Id
251. See id. at 666, 664 A.2d at 899.
252. See id. at 665, 664 A.2d at 898; see also supra notes 229-51 and accompanying
text.
253. See supra note 20 for the text of the Fifth Amendment.
254. See Allen v. State, 91 Md. App. 775, 605 A.2d 994 (1992).
255. See supra notes 18, 92, 94.
256. See supra notes 235-37 and accompanying text.
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The court failed to provide guidance to the lower courts as to
the meanings of "gravity of the offense," "enormity of the loss,"
and "degree of the owner's culpability."257 Indeed, the court's definition of proportionality - "it means simply that there must be a
comparison of the extent of the loss to the relevant factors involved,
including the gravity and extent of the illegal activity, the nexus
between that conduct and the subject property, and the extent of
involvement of the owner mS8 - includes nexus and involvement
requirements that arguably have been measured under the Chandler·
test. 2S9 Thus, the high court provided the lower courts with conflicting, ill defined criteria from which a test must be adduced and
applied.
1.

A Test for All Seasons

While much can be learned from the Austin decision about the
dangers of failing to provide lower courts with an adequate framework, the plethora of tests that have been formulated offer an
opportunity to choose a test that provides defined factors that are
relatively easily applied. The tests promulgated in United States v.
429 South Main Street 260 and United States v. SheUy's Riverside
Heights Lot XU) provide elements that are quantifiable, and hence
workable.
In 429 South Main Street, the claimant had sold an increasing
amount of marijuana on three separate occasions, once in the alley
behind his home and twice on the premises. 262 In upholding the
forfeiture of property, valued at $83,700, the court concentrated on
the objective gravity of the owner's conviction for marijuana sales
totaling ninety-five dollars.263 The gravity of the owner's offense was
measured by looking at two factors. First, the court found that,
because the drug sales were not a one-time occurrence, and the
amount sold increased with each transaction, the behavior of the
257. See Aravanis, 339 Md. at 665, 664 A.2d at 898.
258. [d.
259. The Chandler test "considers (1) the nexus between the offense and the property
and the extent of the property's role in the offense, (2) the role and culpability
of the owner, and (3) the possibility of separating offending property that can
readily be separated from the remainder." United States v. Chandler, 36 F.3d
358, 365 (4th Cir. 1994). The second element is further explained as a determination of the owner's role, i.e., was it incidental or integral to the success
of the criminal activity? See id. at 364.
260. 843 F. Supp. 337 (S.D. Ohio 1993), aiI'd in part, remanded on other grounds,
52 F.3d 1416 (6th Cir. 1995).
261. 851 F. Supp. 633 (M.D. Pa. 1994).
262. See 429 S. Main St., 843 F. Supp. at 340.
263. See id. at 340-41.
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claimant was "suggestive of on-going criminal activity."264 Second,
further indicia of the nature of the crime was found by comparing
the maximum penalties under the federal drug statute (a sentence of
ten years and a $500,000 finefi s with the owner's aggregate sentence
and penalties (the assessed criminal penalties of one year and a $6000
fine plus the value of the property).266 Because the penalties were
well within the sentencing guidelines, the forfeiture was held not to
be disproportionate to the seriousness of the offense, and hence, not
excessive.267 On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit affirmed the trial judge's decision stating that the owner
did not raise issues of material fact as to whether the property was
not used in the sale of drugs nor that the fine was excessive. 268
Thus, the 429 South Main Street court provided an objective
standard with which to evaluate civil in rem forfeiture. The first step
of the process is to determine whether the criminal activity is a onetime occurrence, or an on-going activity. The final step is to compare
the aggregate penalty with the maximum penalty provided by statute.
If the total falls within the legislative mandate then the forfeiture is
not excessive.
Additional guidance is provided by Shelly's Riverside Heights
Lot )(269 where the Government sought forfeiture of a log cabin and
the ten-acre parcel that surrounded it.270 The owners were convicted
of various drug offenses arising out of the cultivation, on the
property, of marijuana for their personal consumption. 271 The trial
judge found the forfeiture to be excessive for the following reasons:
(1) the harmful reach of the crime was minimal because the illegal
conduct did not go beyond the property; (2) the loss was significant
to the owners because it was their sole asset; and (3) the government
had failed to prove that the owners accrued any benefits from the
drug activity outside the ready supply of marijuana they enjoyed. 272

264.
265.
266.
267.
268.
269.
270.
271.
272.

[d. at 342.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See United States v. 429 S. Main St., 52 F.3d 1416, 1422 (6th Cir. 1995).
851 F. Supp. 633 (M.D. Pa. 1994).
See id. at 635.
See id. at 634.
See id. at 638. The trial judge relied on a test set forth in United States v.
Sorbello, 985 F.2d 716, 724 (3d Cir. 1993) (holding the factors to be weighed
in determining excessiveness include "the seriousness of the offense, including
the moral gravity of the crime measured in terms of the magnitude and nature
of its harmful reach, against the severity of the criminal sanction!,] ... the
personal benefit reaped by the defendant, the defendant's motive and culpability, and, of course, the extent that the defendant's interest in the enterprise
itself are tainted by criminal conduct").
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Thus, in determining excessiveness, the court looked at the objective
harm caused by the criminal activity, the significance of the asset to
the property owners, and the benefits accrued by the criminal activity.
While both 429 South Main Street and Shelly's Riverside Heights
Lot X provide identifiable criteria to apply to civil in rem forfeiture,
an additional element, put forth in Chandler and true to the historical
meaning of in rem forfeiture, should also be applied. The first
element of the Chandler test, which measures the "involvement of
the property in the offense,''273 must also be a factor in determining
excessiveness. The addition of this factor allows trial judges to
consider the importance of the property to the underlying offense.
Further, it permits forfeiture of property, regardless of its value, that
is central to the criminal activity.
Formulating a test relying on the amalgamation of these factors,
yields a workable result. When the aggregate penalties, including the
value of the forfeiture and the criminal sentence and fines imposed,
are within the statutory maximum provided by the legislature, a
rebuttable presumption of forfeitability is established. This presumption can be overcome by the property owner showing that the harmful
reach of the criminal activity was minimal, that no benefits were
accrued by the activity, and that the property is the family home
and the owner's sole asset.
Conversely, forfeiture that exceeds the statutory maximum creates a rebuttable presumption of excessiveness. The government can
overcome this presumption by showing that the property was so
central to the criminal activity that it was, in actuality, an instrumentality of the offense. The factors enunciated in Chandler provide
an excellent guide to this analysis. That is:
(1) whether the use of the property in the offense was
deliberate and planned or merely incidental and fortuitous;
(2) whether the property was important to the success of
the illegal activity; (3) the time during which the property
was illegally used and the spatial extent of its use; (4)
whether its illegal use was an isolated event or had been
repeated; and (5) whether the purpose of acquiring, maintaining or using the property was to carry out the offense. 274
The proposed test, therefore, takes the best each of the three
decisions have to offer. It provides criteria that are measurable. Most
importantly, it is a tool that trial courts can use to determine
excessiveness in a uniform and objective manner.

273. United States v. Chandler, 36 F.3d 358, 364 (4th Cir. 1994).
274. Id at 365.
.
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B. The Double Jeopardy Clause
By their very nature, civil in rem forfeiture actions are instituted
following the use of property in a criminal activity.275 As explained
above, the Supreme Court in Austin determined that such actions
constituted governmentally imposed punishment subject to constitutionallimitations and protections. 276 Accordingly, the forfeiture could
be viewed as a second punishment for the underlying criminal offense. 'Il7 In light of this dilemma, it becomes necessary to determine
if civil in rem forfeiture, in conjunction with a criminal prosecution,
offends the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
The Background of the Double Jeopardy Clause
The application of the Double Jeopardy Clause to the civil arena
was addressed by the Supreme Court of the United States in United
States v. Halper. 278 The Halper Court held that the Double Jeopardy
Clause of the Fifth Amendment protects citizens against three types
of governmental abuse: (1) a second prosecution for the same offense
after acquittal; 279 (2) a second prosecution for the same offense after
conviction;280 and (3) multiple punishments for the same offense. 281
The third type of abuse, mUltiple punishment, is called into question
when civil in rem forfeiture statutes are applied.282
1.

275. See supra notes 30-42, 47-51 and accompanying text.
276. See supra notes 79-87 and accompanying text.
277. See United States v. One Parcel Real Property, 908 F. Supp. 1070, 1075 (D.R.I.
1995); State v. Leyva, 909 P.2d 506, 510 (Az. Ct. App. 1995).
278. 490 U.S. 435 (1989). The prohibition against double jeopardy is established,
in Maryland, as a basic principle of common law and under the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution. See Parojinog v.
State, 282 Md. 256, 260, 384 A.2d 86, 88 (1978). "Federal double jeopardy
principles are controlling in determining whether a defendant has been placed
twice in jeopardy in violation of the federal Constitution." Johnson v. State,
95 Md. App. 561, 566, 622 A.2d 199, 202 (1993) (citing Newton v. State, 280
Md. 260, 373 A.2d 262 (1977». While the Court of Appeals of Maryland
recently addressed the interplay between civil forfeiture (albeit not in rem),
crhninal prosecution, and the Double Jeopardy Clause, it reached its conclusion
by determining what constitutes punishment under the clause, and not with
reference to the Halper criteria. See State v. Jones, 340 Md. 235, 666 A.2d
128 (1995); see also infra notes 309-17 and accompanying text. The forfeiture
action addressed by the Maryland court was in personam versus in rem. See
supra notes 21-42 and accompanying text for a discussion of the distinction
between in rem and in personam proceedings.
279. See United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662, 668-69 (1896).
280. See Price v. Georgia, 398 U.S. 323, 331 (1970).
281. See Halper, 490 U.S. at 440; see also North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711,
717 (1969); Randall Book Corp. v. State, 316 Md. 315, 323, 558 A.2d 715,
719 (1989); Johnson, 95 Md. App. at 565, 622 A.2d at 202.
282. See Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 165 (1977); United States v. Perez, 70 F.3d
345, 349 (1995).
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The Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether in rem
forfeiture violates the Double Jeopardy Clause in United States v.
Ursery.283 The Court held that "civil forfeiture does not constitute
punishment for the purpose of the Double Jeopardy Clause."284
Specifically, the Court applied a two prong test to determine if the
forfeiture at issue violated the Double Jeopardy Clause. 28s First, the
applicable forfeiture statuteg286 were examined to determine if Congress intended them to be civil or criminal proceedings. 287 Second,
the Court considered whether the proceedings themselves were so
punitive "in fact as to 'persuade us that the forfeiture proceeding[s]
may not be viewed as civil in nature,' despite Congress's intent. "288
The Court noted that the procedural mechanisms of the statutes
at issue indicated Congress's intent that the statutes be civil in
nature. 289 Turning to the second factor, the Court found "little
evidence" that the forfeiture proceedings were so punitive as to
contravene Congress's intent.290 Thus, the Court held that the nature
of civil in rem proceedings creates a presumption that such forfeitures
are not subject to double jeopardy protection. 291
This presumption is, however, rebuttable "where the 'clearest
proof' indicates that an in rem civil forfeiture is 'so punitive either
in purpose or effect' as to be equivalent to a criminal proceeding. "292
It is instructive, therefore, to examine the applicability of the Double
Jeopardy Clause to instances where this presumption may be over283.
284.
285.
286.
287.
288.
289.

290.

291.
292.

116 S. Ct. 2135 (1996).
Id at 2147.
See id.
See 21 U.S.C. § 881 (1994); 18 U.S.C. § 981 (1994).
See Ursery, 116 S. Ct. at 2147.
Id. (quoting United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354,
366 (1984».
See id. The Court recognized that they are in rem proceedings that are brought
directly against property and, hence, are impersonal. See id. Specifically, the
statutory scheme promulgated by Congress does not require actual notice if
the government cannot identify a party with interest in the targeted property.
See id. (discussing 19 U.S.C. § 1607 (1984». The burden of proof in such
proceedings also indicated to the Court that Congress intended this to be a
civil proceeding. See id. at 2148; see also supra note 53.
See Ursery, 116 S. Ct. at 2148. Specifically, the Court found that the goals of
the drug forfeiture statutes were nonpunitive. See id. The Court also examined
other traditional indications of punishment. See id. at 2149. First, the Court
determined that civil in rem forfeiture has not historically been regarded as
punishment, under the Double Jeopardy Clause. See id. Second, the scienter
requirement for crimes is not evident in the forfeiture statutes. See id. Finally,
the Court found that while the statutes serve a deterrent purpose this, in and
of itself, does not render them punishment. See id.
See id. at 2148 n.3, 2149.
Id. at 2148 n.3 (quoting United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465
U.S. 354, 365 (1984».
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come.293 Whether a civil forfeiture action places an individual twice
in jeopardy for the same offense depends on three factors: 294 (1)
whether the forfeiture constitutes "punishment";29S (2) whether the
forfeiture action and the criminal prosecution constitute "separate
proceedings"; 296 and (3) whether the criminal conviction and the
forfeiture proceeding are for the "same offense.''297 If all three of
these factors are satisfied, the forfeiture will be in violation of the
Double Jeopardy Clause. 298
2.

The Elements of Double Jeopardy

Forfeiture as Punishment
The Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits the government from
seeking a second criminal punishment in a separate proceeding for
the same conduct. 299 Civil sanctions, while a detriment to the indi-

Q.

293. It is also well held that a State is free as a matter of its own law to impose
greater restrictions on law enforcement than those the Supreme Court of the
United States holds to be required under federal constitutional standards. See
Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 719 (1975). This tenet is especially relevant in
the case at bar because the Court of Appeals of Maryland rested its decision
on state constitutional grounds, i.e. article 25, and not on provisions of the
federal constitution. See id. at 719-20.
294. The Maryland courts have interpreted the Halper Court's application of the
Double Jeopardy Clause to civil proceedings very narrowly. See, e.g., Johnson
v. State, 95 Md. App. 561, 568, 622 A.2d 199, 203 (1993). In Maryland, the
"separate proceeding" and "forfeiture as punishment" inquiries have been
conflated and resolved by determining if a proceeding is civil or criminal in
nature. See, e.g., id.; Allen v. State, 91 Md. App. 775, 785, 605 A.2d 994,
999 (1992). The determination of whether the "same offense" prohibition is
violated follows the Blockburger test, which in Maryland is referred to as the
"required evidence test." See State v. Lancaster, 332 Md. 385, 391, 631 A.2d
453, 456 (1993).
295. See United States v. $405,089.23 U.S. Currency, 33 F.3d 1210, 1216 (9th Cir.
1994) amended by 56 F.3d 41 (9th Cir. 1995), rev'd sub nom. United States
v. Ursery, 116 S. Ct. 2135 (1996) (reversing the Ninth Circuit's determination
that civil in rem forfeiture was per se punishment but not reaching the issues
of "same offense" and "separate proceeding"); see also supra notes 283-92
and accompanying text.
296. See $405,089.23 U.S. Currency, 33 F.3d at 1216.
297. See United States v. Falkowski, 900 F. Supp. 1207, 1213 (D. Alaska 1995).
298. See $405,089.23 U.S. Currency, 33 F.3d at 1210 (holding that civil in rem
forfeiture is per se punishment under the Double Jeopardy Clause, and that
the proceedings are separate proceedings and thus violate the Double Jeopardy
Clause). But see Falkowski, 900 F. Supp. at 1214-15 (holding that civil forfeiture
is not the same offense as criminal activity and, therefore, the Double Jeopardy
Clause is not violated).
299. See, e.g., One Lot Emerald Cut Stone v. United States, 409 U.S. 232, 235-36
(1972); Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 399 (1938).
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vidual, have traditionally not been subjected to double jeopardy
analysis because such sanctions are remedial in nature and are used
to ensure that the government is made whole.3°O Nevertheless, in
Halper, the Court subjected civil forfeiture to the Double Jeopardy
Clause for the first time. 301 In Halper, the Court restricted the
application of the Double Jeopardy Clause to the "rare case . . .
where a fixed penalty provision subjects a prolific but small-gauge
offender to a sanction overwhelmingly disproportionate to the damages he has caused. "302 Accordingly, the Court defined "rare case"
as one in which "a defendant who has already been punished in a
criminal prosecution [is] subjected to an additional civil sanction to
the extent that the second sanction may not fairly be characterized
as remedial, but only as a deterrent or retribution." 303
Thus, the Halper Court carved out an exception to double
jeopardy application in civil actions.304 Under Halper, the Double
Jeopardy Clause is implicated in the "rare case" that subjects a
small time offender to a sanction grossly disproportionate to the
harm caused. 30s The measurement of harm caused includes the costs
incurred by society for the adjudication, investigation, and incarceration of the offender.306 Thus, civil sanctions, under Halper, are
presumed not to be punitive, unless they are grossly disproportionate
to the damage caused and, hence, qualify as the required "rare
case. "307 Therefore, the effect of the sanction will determine whether
or not the civil sanction is punitive and whether it invokes the Double
Jeopardy Clause.
By contrast, punishment under the Fifth Amendment in Maryland has historically been determined by establishing whether a statute
is civil or criminal in nature. 3OS Following Aravanis and Austin, this
1996]

300. See, e.g., United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354
(1984); Rex Trailer Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 148 (1956); United States
v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 551-52 (1943).
301. See United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 441 (1989).
302. Id. at 449.
303. Id. at 448-49.
304. See id. at 449-50.
305. See id.
306. See id.
307. See supra note 290 and accompanying text.
308. See Johnson v. State, 95 Md. App. 561, 568, 622 A.2d 199, 203 (1993). The
character of the proceeding has, since Halper, been the bellwether test for
determining whether civil penalties, assessed either subsequently, see Ewachiw
v. Director of Fin., 70 Md. App. 58, 519 A.2d 1327 (1987), or prior to, see
Allen v. State, 91 Md. App. 775, 789, 605 A.2d 994, 1001 (1992), criminal
prosecution constitute double jeopardy. In classifying such actions the courts
give great deference to the legislature and the intent and effect of the statutes
that have been implicated. See Johnson, 95 Md. App. at 568, 622 A.2d at
203. The primary inquiry is whether the statute was enacted to achieve a
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analysis may change. While not directly addressing civil in rem
forfeiture, the Court of Appeals of Maryland recently indicated that
the Austin analysis may apply to the Fifth Amendment. 309
"legitimate governmental purpose" separate and apart from any incidental
punitive effect. See Allen, 91 Md. App. at 785-86, 605 A.2d at 999-1000. Thus,
if the legislative purpose was to punish an individual for specific acts, the
statute was considered penal in nature; however, if it was enacted to curtail
or discourage behavior deemed threatening to the future health and welfare of
society as a whole, the statute was "Considered remedial and non-punitive. See
id.
Additionally, the procedural requirements of the statute are examined to
determine if the statute is criminal or civil in nature. See id. at 786-87, 605
A.2d at 1000. The factors analyzed include the standard of proof, whether the
penalty could be imposed at the discretion of the trial judge, and the type of
remedy provided by statute. See id. A preponderance of the evidence standard
indicated that the proceeding was civil in nature. See id. Further, lack of
discretion, on behalf of the trial judge, indicated a non-punitive purpose. See
id "[S]tatute's mandate must be obeyed for it is not a penalty imposed as
part of the criminal punishment that can be invoked at the discretion of the
trial judge." State v. One 1967 Ford Mustang, 266 Md. 275, 278, 292 A.2d
64, 66 (1972).
Relying on Halper, the Maryland court categorized actions that impose
restrictions on the trial judge's discretion, as to the imposition and form of
the penalty, as strict liability crimes which "are principally directed at social
betterment rather than punishment of the culpable individual." Allen, 91 Md.
App. at 787, 605 A.2d at 1000 (citing United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435,
447 n.8 (1989». Statutes, therefore, that satisfy the above requirements are
considered civil and non-punitive and do not "run afoul" of the Double
Jeopardy Clause. See id.
This framework was applied to Maryland's drug forfeiture statute, MD.
ANN. CODE art. 27, § 297 (1992), in Allen v. State, 91 Md. App. 775, 605
A.2d 994 (1992). In Allen, the defendant was convicted of possession of a
controlled dangerous substance. See id. at 778, 605 A.2d at 995. Prior to his
conviction, the defendant's truck was forfeited pursuant to Maryland's drug
forfeiture statute. See id. at 782, 605 A.2d at 997. Relying on Halper, the
defendant argued that forfeiture of his truck constituted punishment and,
therefore, his subsequent criminal conviction violated the Double Jeopardy
Clause of the Fifth Amendment. See id. at 782, 605 A.2d at 998.
Following the parameters set forth in Halper, the court of special appeals
evaluated the forfeiture statute at issue, art. 27, § 297, as to whether it was
civil or criminal in nature. See id. at 785-88, 605 A.2d at 999-1000. In making
its determination, the court relied on the legislative purpose behind the statute,
see id. at 785-86, 605 A.2d at 999, and its statutory scheme, see id. at 787-88,
605 A.2d at 1000. The court determined that the legislative purpose was "to
curtail and discourage drug use and trafficking" and did not have, as its
primary goal, punishment of drug offenders. [d. at 786, 605 A2d at 999-1000.
Further, the statute's required burden of proof (a mere preponderance of the
evidence versus beyond a reasonable doubt) indicated to the court that the
statute was civil. See id. at 786, 605 A.2d at 1000. Additionally, the lack of
judicial discretion afforded the trial judge, as to the penalty required by the
statute, further indicated that the statute served a remedial as opposed to
punitive goal. See id. In light of the above analysis the court held that "[s]ection
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In State v. Jones,310 the court was faced with a double jeopardy
challenge arising out of the suspension of a driver's license followed
by a trial and conviction of drunk driving.3J1 Jones appealed to the
Circuit Court for Montgomery County, where he filed a motion to
dismiss based on double jeopardy grounds. 312 The circuit court found
that Jones had been subjected to double jeopardy and dismissed the
drunk driving conviction.313 The Court of Appeals of Maryland
granted certiorari on its own motion and, finding that the suspension
of Jones's license was not punitive but remedial in nature, reversed
the circuit court's decision. 314
The court, in its determination that the statute under which
Jones's license was suspended was not punitive, referred directly to
Austin.31S Specifically, the court stated that the issue at bar was
whether or not the statute in question could be "fairly" characterized
as serving a non-punitive purpose. 316 The court set forth a three-part
test to make this determination: (1) whether the statute at issue has
historically been understood to constitute punishment; (2) whether,
after examining the plain language and structure of the statute and
to some degree its legislative history, the statute evinces a purpose
different from the historic understanding given to analogous statutes;
and (3) whether, if the statute serves both punitive and non-punitive
purposes, the non-punitive purpose alone can justify the penalty
imposed. 317
These elements, coupled with the recent holding in Aravanis,
indicate that the Double Jeopardy Clause may now apply in Maryland
to civil in rem drug forfeiture on a per se basis. In Aravanis, the
court determined that in rem forfeiture has historically been understood to punish.318 Further, it noted that the "purpose of the Maryland forfeiture statute is, at least in part, punitive." 319 The first two

309.
310.
311.
312.
313.
314.
315.
316.
317.
318.
319.

2fJ7 is a civil statute" and "that a forfeiture proceeding is a civil action and
when brought prior or subsequent to a criminal proceeding does not involve
the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment nor the Maryland
common law double jeopardy prohibition." Id. at 788, 605 A.2d at 1000.
See State v. Jones, 340 Md. 235, 666 A.2d 128 (1995), cert. denied, 116 S.
Ct. 1265 (1996).
Id.
See id. at 240, 666 A.2d at 130.
See id. at 241, 666 A.2d at 131.
See id.
See id. at 251, 666 A.2d at 136.
See id. at 245-51, 666 A.2d at 132-36.
See id. at 250, 666 A.2d at 135.
See id.
See Aravanis v. Somerset County, 339 Md. 644, 653, 664 A.2d 888, 892 (1995),
cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 916 (1996).
Id. at 655, 664 A.2d at 893.
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elements of the Jones test have, therefore, been satisfied. The lone
element of the Jones test yet to be determined in the civil in rem
forfeiture arena is whether the non-punitive purpose of the drug
forfeiture statutes can justify the penalties imposed.
From the court's finding that section 297 serves in part to
punish,l20 it can be inferred that the Maryland forfeiture statute
serves remedial goals as well. Referencing a state senate floor report,
the court noted that forfeiture is intended to be a "powerful prosecutorial tool for stopping CDS [controlled dangerous substance]
offenders and depriving them of the huge profits reaped from their
illegal activity." 321 While the court construed this as a punitive
purpose, this statement can also be construed as remedial in nature.
As the court's discussion in Aravanis equated the purpose of the
Maryland statute to the purpose of the Federal Act,322 it is instructive
to examine judicial interpretation of the Federal Act.
The gravity of drug offenses and the harm they cause to society
has been well acknowledged. In Department oj Revenue v. Kurth
Ranch,323 Justice O'Connor, in dissent, noted that drug offenders
should be at least partially responsible for the "money spent on drug
abuse education, deterrence, and treatment. "324 Additionally, it has
been recognized that the moral gravity of drug offenses represents
"one of the greatest problems affecting the health arid welfare of
our population." 325 Thus,
Quite apart from the pernicious effects on the individual
who consumes illegal drugs, such drugs relate to crime in
at least three ways: (1) A drug user may commit crime
because of drug-induced changes in physiological functions,
cognitive ability, and mood; (2) A drug user may commit
crime in order to obtain money to buy drugs; and (3) A
violent crime may occur as part of the drug business or
culture. 326
It can be concluded, therefore, that congressional and legislative acts
that curtail drug activity have a remedial purpose ..
While Maryland's high court has stated that section 297 is partpunishment because it strips assets from drug dealers and offenders,
there is a remedial aspect to the statute. In depriving drug offenders

320.
321.
322.
323.
324.
325.
326.

See id. at 653, 664 A.2d at 892.
Id at 655, 664 A.2d at 893 (S.B. 419, Floor Report, at 4 (Md. 1989».
See id. at 655, 664 A.2d at 893.
511 U.S. 767 (1994) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
Id. at 794 (O'Connor, J. dissenting).
National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 668 (1989).
Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1002 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring in
part and concurring in judgment).
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of "tainted" property, they are less able to regain entry into the
drug market. This is illustrated by Aravanis's entry into the drug
market. He acquired the funds to start his drug operation through
the sale of a portion of his land.327 Absent those assets, he may have
never amassed the funds necessary to participate in the distribution
of marijuana. Additionally, the curtailment of drug activity may
decrease related crimes and, thereby, reduce the extensive social costs
of illegal drug activity.
It may be argued, therefore, that the non-punitive purpose of
the drug forfeiture statute justifies the penalties it imposes. If this
reasoning is rejected, and it is determined that the drug forfeiture
statute is indeed punishment, further double jeopardy analysis is
required. That is, the remaining elements of a double jeopardy
violation must be satisfied. It must be shown that the forfeiture
action is a separate proceeding for the same offense. 328

b.

Separate Proceeding

The Double Jeopardy Clause does not prohibit the government
from seeking both the full range of statutorily authorized civil and
criminal penalties.329 It does, however, require that two actions that
seek to punish for the same offense be brought in the same proceeding.330 This constraint is intended to prevent the government from
seeking "a second punishment [because] it is dissatisfied with the
punishment levied in the first action"33l or making "repeated attempts
to convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting
him to embarrassment, expense, and ordeal and compelling him to
live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity." 332
Civil actions and criminal prosecutions are inherently distinct in
nature.333 The federal circuit courts are, however, split as to whether
327. See Aravanis, 339 Md. at 646-47, 664 A.2d at 889.
328. See supra notes 292-96 and accompanying text.
329. See United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 450 (1989); accord Ohio v. Johnson,
467 U.S. 493, 500 (1984) (noting that the Clause does not prohibit the
prosecution of multiple offenses within a single prosecution).
330. See United States v. $405,089.23 U.S. Currency, 33 F.3d 1210, 1216 (9th Cir.
1994), amended by, 56 F.3d 41 (9th Cir. 1995), rev'd sub nom. United States
v. Ursery, 116 S. Ct. 2135 (1996).
331. United States v. Millan, 2 F.3d 17, 20 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied sub nom.
Bottone v. United States, 510 U.S. 1092 (1994).
332. Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187 (1957).
333. Civil and criminal proceedings are governed by different constitutional tenets,
require different procedural rules, and are evaluated under different burdens
of proof. See Peter J. Henning, Precedents in a Vacuum: The Supreme Court
Continues to Tinker with Double Jeopardy, 31 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 1, 54, 67
(Fall 1993).
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civil in rem forfeiture and the related criminal conviction are but
separate prongs of a single, coordinated proceeding. 334 The Second
Circuit, in United States v. Millan, promulgated a three-part test to
determine if civil and criminal action constitute a single, coordinated
proceeding: (1) whether both actions were filed nearly contemporaneously; (2) whether the two actions involved the same criminal
conduct; and (3) whether the two actions were part of a "coordinated
effort to put an end to extensive" criminal activity. 33S This approach
was soundly rejected by the Ninth Circuit in United States v.
$405,089.23. 336 Rather, in $405,089.23, the court, focusing on the
procedural differences between criminal and civil actions,337 held that
a "forfeiture case and a criminal prosecution would constitute the
same proceeding only if they were brought in the same indictment
and tried at the same time. "338
The question as to whether civil in rem forfeiture and criminal
prosecution for the underlying offense are considered separate proceedings has not been reached by the Maryland courts. Prior to
Aravanis, this determination was based solely on the nature of the
proceeding. If this analysis survives Aravanis, or if the approach
promulgated by the Ninth Circuit 339 is adopted, civil in rem drug
forfeitures will be considered separate proceedings and may violate
the Double Jeopardy Clause.340 Conversely, if the Maryland courts
adopt the Millan analysis,341 double jeopardy implications will be
avoided if: (1) the actions are filed nearly contemporaneously; (2)
the two actions involve the same conduct; and (3) the two actions
are part of a coordinated effort to end extensive criminal activity. 342
The prohibition against separate proceedings is intended to prevent the government from bringing a second action when it was
dissatisfied with the result in the first action 343 and to protect an

334. See, e.g., United States v. 18755 N. Bay Rd., 13 F.3d 1493, 1499 (1lth Cir.
1994); Millan, 2 F.3d at 20; United States v. Smith, 874 F. Supp. 347, 350
(N.D. Alaska 1995), aiI'd, 92 F.3d 1200 (11th Cir. 1996). But see $405,089.23
U.S. Currency, 33 F.3d at 1216; United States v. Torres, 28 F.3d 1463, 1465
(7th Cir), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 669 (1994).
335. See Millan, 2 F.3d at 20.
336. 33 F.3d at 1216-22.
337. The court noted that the two actions are tried at different times, before
different fact finders and judges, and result in separate judgments. See id. at
1216-17.
338. [d.
339. See supra notes 335-37 and accompanying text.
340. See supra notes 335-37 and accompanying text.
341. See supra notes 294-98 and accompanying text.
342. See United States v. Millan, 2 F.3d 17, 20 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied sub
nom. Bottone v. United States, 510 U.S. 1092 (1994).
343. See id.
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individual from the expense and anxiety associated with repeated
prosecutions.344 Requiring adherence to the Millan factors 34S minimizes
these dangers. The contemporaneous filing requirement gives notice
to the defendant that both actions will be litigated, and therefore,
the anxiety of wondering if further prosecution will follow is eliminated. Likewise, because the actions are filed at the same time, it
cannot be claimed that the government instituted a second prosecution
because it was dissatisfied with an earlier result, as neither case will
have reached a final judgment.
The Millan approach offers a pragmatic solution to the separate
proceedings dilemma. It protects defendants and their property, while
avoiding the dangers of prosecutorial harassment. The rejection of
Millan, however, and a finding that the forfeiture action is indeed a
separate proceeding does not necessarily implicate the Double Jeopardy Oause. The "same offense" prong must also be satisfied for
the Double Jeopardy Clause to be violated.346
1996]

c.

Same Offense

In order for a defendant to prove a violation of the Double
Jeopardy Clause, the defendant must also show that he is being
punished twice for the same offense. 347 The sole test for determining
when two offenses are properly considered the same offense is known
as the "same elements" or "Blockburger test. '>348 This test requires
344.
345.
346.
347.
348.

See Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187-88 (1957).
See Millan, 2 F.3d at 20.
See supra notes 292-96 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 292-96 and accompanying text.
Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932); see also, e.g., United
States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688, 696 (1993); Randall Book Corp. v. State, 316
Md. 315, 323, 558 A.2d 715, 719 (1989). The Blockburger test, or as it is
labeled in Maryland the "required evidence test," is also applied in Maryland
to determine if a second prosecution is barred by double jeopardy. See Snowden
v. State, 321 Md. 612, 616-17, 583 A.2d 1056, 1058-59 (1991). The "required
evidence test" was applied to civil in rem forfeiture in Allen v. State, 91 Md.
App. 775, 788-89, 605 A.2d 994, 1000-01 (1992). The Allen court determined
that civil forfeiture, pursuant to Section 297 of Article 27 of the Annotated
Code of Maryland, was not a lesser included offense of possession of controlled
dangerous substances. See id. at 789, 605 A.2d at 1001. The forfeiture statute
holds the owner of the property strictly liable for the property's illegal use
and, therefore, intent need not be proved by the state. See id. (discussing §
297). Conversely, conviction of possession of a controlled dangerous substance
(CDS) requires that the state prove intent. See id. (discussing §297). "Thus,
neither civil forfeiture nor criminal CDS charges require the establishment of
an essential element of the other." [d. Furthermore, the court recognized that
in civil forfeiture the property is the defendant, as opposed to an individual
defendant in criminal CDS cases. See id. The court held, therefore, that under
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a court to focus on the statutes involved, and determine what the
prosecuting party is required to prove in order to successfully demonstrate a prima Jacie case. 349 If each statute requires proof of an
element the other does not, then the two offenses are deemed separate
offenses under the Double Jeopardy Clause.3so The handful of district
courts that have reached this issue have found civil in rem forfeiture
and the related criminal offense each to contain an element the other
does not 3S1 and, therefore, have determined that the Double Jeopardy
Clause was not implicated.3S2

349.
350.
351.

352.

the "required evidence test" civil forfeiture subsequent or prior to criminal
proceedings does not offend the Double Jeopardy Clause. See id.
The decision in Aravanis v. Somerset County, 339 Md. 644, 655, 664 A.2d
888, 893 (1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 916 (1996), that civil in rem drug
forfeiture is punishment is a marked departure from the determination in Allen
that section 297 is a civil statute. See Allen, 91 Md. App. at 738-88, 605 A.2d
at 998-1000. The ramifications of this new characterization on double jeopardy
application to the civil arena will depend upon the Maryland court's determination of: (1) whether the forfeiture action and the criminal prosecution
constitute "separate proceedings"; (2) whether the criminal conviction and the
forfeiture proceeding are for the "same offense"; and (3) whether the forfeiture
constitutes "punishment." If it is determined that a forfeiture satisfies all three
of the above factors, it violates the Double Jeopardy Clause.
See Dixon, 509 U.S. at 696-97; United States v. White, I F.3d 13, 16 (D.C.
Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1111 (1994).
See Dixon, 509 U.S. at 696.
See, e.g., United States v. Chick, 61 F.3d 682, 687 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding
that civil in rem forfeiture and criminal offenses each required proof of an
element that the other did not); United States v. Falkowski, 900 F. Supp. 1207,
1214-15 (D. Alaska 1995) (holding civil forfeiture and drug charges each contain
element other does not, and thus Double Jeopardy Clause not violated); United
States v. Thibault, 897 F. Supp. 495, 498 (D. Colo. 1995) (holding forfeiture
was punishment for double jeopardy purposes and that actions for forfeiture
and criminal conviction separate proceedings but that forfeiture and drug
charges not same offense so Double Jeopardy Clause not violated); United
States v. Amaya, 877 F. Supp. 528, 530 (D. Or. 1995) (holding forfeiture of
firearms and criminal conviction of distribution of cocaine not same offense
based on same elements test), a/I'd, 67 F.3d 309 (9th Cir. 1995); United States
v. $7,137.02, 1995 WL 505481, ·5-6 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 18, 1995) (holding that
civil forfeiture action seeking "illegal money" not barred by money laundering
criminal conviction based on "same elements" test); United States v. Leaniz,
1995 WL 143127, ·5 (S.D. Ohio March 31, 1995) (holding that elements of
federal drug forfeiture statute are not the same as those of a conviction of
possession with intent to distribute, and therefore, it is not the same offense
even though based on the same conduct).
An alternative analysis, based on a careful reading of Dixon, suggests that the
substantive criminal offense constitutes a "lesser included offense" and, therefore, offends the Double Jeopardy Clause. See Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161,
168-69 (1977) (holding double jeopardy prohibits government from prosecuting
a defendant, once convicted, for a crime that contains all of the elements of
the offense for which they were previously convicted).
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An examination of the required elements of civil in rem forfeiture
and the related substantive criminal offense reveal that each contain
an element the other does not. 353 Specifically, the element required
by in rem forfeiture, but not required by the related drug offenses,
is proof that the property is "guilty. "354 In an in rem action, the
government is not required to prove that the owner of the property
had any involvement in the criminal drug offense that gives rise to
civil in rem forfeiture. 355 In rem forfeiture provisions generally only
require that the government prove an actus reus elemenP56 - that
the property was used in connection with a drug offense. 3S7 "In
contrast, none of the criminal statutes require the use of any specific
property to prove guilt.''358 Likewise, the criminal offenses require
proof of an element not contained in the civil forfeiture statute mens rea. 359 Unlike in rem forfeiture actions where the government
need only prove an actus reus element, in the criminal prosecution
the government must prove both an actus reus and mens rea. 360 Thus,
in rem forfeiture and drug offenses each contain an element the
other does not and, therefore, the Double Jeopardy Clause is not
violated.
Applying this analysis to the instant case yields much the same
result. Aravanis was convicted of "one count of possession of a
controlled dangerous substance in sufficient amount to indicate an
intent to manufacture, distribute, or dispense pursuant to article 27,
section 286. "361 The statute expressly requires the proof of both mens
rea (intent) and actus reus (manufacture, distribution, or dispensing).362 Aravanis' s property was seized pursuant to article 27, section
297(m) because it was used in connection with a violation of section
286. 363 The statute did not require that Aravanis use the property for
illegal drug activities; it only required that the property be used for
such activities. The statute, thus, did not require mens rea or intent

353. See Falkowski, 900 F. Supp. at 1213.
354. See United States v. Chandler, 36 F.3d 358, 362 (4th Cir. 1994).
355. See id. at 362; see also Joy Chatman, Note, Losing the Battle, but Not the
War: The Future Use of Civil Forfeiture By Law Enforcement Agencies After
Austin v. United States, 38 ST. LOUIS L. J. 739, 744 (1994).
356. Actus reus is a wrongful deed. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 36 (6th ed. 1990).
357. See United States v. Thibault, 897 F. Supp. 495, 498 (D. Colo. 1995).
358. United States v. Falkowski, 900 F. Supp. 1207, 1214 (D. Alaska 1995).
359. See id. Mens rea is "an element of criminal responsibility: a guilty mind; a
'guilty or wrongful purpose; a criminal intent." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 985
(6th ed. 1990).
360. See Falkowski, 900 F. Supp. at 1213-14.
361. Aravanis v. Somerset County, 339 Md. 644, 647, 664 ,A.2d 888, 889 (1995),
cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 916 (1996).
362. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 286 (1996).
363. See Aravanis, 339 Md. at 649 n.7, 664 A.2d at 890 n.7.
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be proven.364 Following this model of analysis the "required evidence
test" is satisfied and the Double Jeopardy Clause is not violated. 36s

V.

CONCLUSION

Civil in rem forfeiture historically focused on the "guilt" of an
inanimate object. Finding this premise to be legal fiction, the Supreme
Court, in Austin, recognized that such forfeitures focus on the
culpability of the owner of the "thing" and afforded constitutional
protection to them. The Court of Appeals of Maryland followed suit
in Aravanis. This fundamental change in the scheme of in rem
forfeiture characterizes such actions as governmentally imposed punishment. While the constitutional protections offer owners of seized,
or threatened, property a check on sometimes overzealous law enforcement, the ramifications of this determination may preclude its
use in the future.
The court's determination that civil in rem forfeiture is a punitive
statute will necessarily be utilized by felons and drug offenders to
mount attacks on their convictions or asset forfeitures on double
jeopardy grounds. It is unclear if the required elements for their
success - separate proceedings that seek to punish for the same
offense - will be satisfied. The Maryland court's decision in Jones
has further clouded this issue. While the Constitution should not be

364. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 297 (1996).
365. Alternatively, a second, broader approach, which has not been adopted by any
court at this writing, would yield a contrary result. In Dixon, the Court found
a subsequent prosecution for a drug offense was barred by a previous contempt
sanction. See United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688, 700 (1993). The defendants
were found in criminal contempt of court for "violating court orders that
prohibited them from engaging in conduct that was later the subject of a
criminal prosecution." [d. at 691. The Court held that the crime of violating
the contempt order could not be abstracted from the substantive criminal drug
offense, as the drug offense was, in effect, a lesser included offense. See id.
at 698. Under this analysis, the Double Jeopardy Clause was violated. See id.
at 700. Applying this analysis to Aravanis may lead to a bar against civil in
rem forfeiture following a criminal conviction. Section 297 of the forfeiture
statute specifically requires section 286 to have been violated. Following Dixon,
the incorporated criminal code (section 286) becomes a '''species of lesserincluded offense[s).'" Dixon, 509 U.S. at 698 (quoting Illinois v. Vitale, 447
U.S. 410, 420 (1980». This approach may be defeated, however, because Dixon
was an in personam proceeding requiring the defendants, and no others, to
violate the contempt order. In contrast, the forfeiture statutes do not require
the government to prove that Aravanis was guilty of violating section 286.
They need only show that activity violative of section 286 occurred on the
property.
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a casualty of the 'war on drugs,366 the analysis put forth in this
discussion affords courts an avenue that maintains the integrity of
the Constitution, and does not remove a well intentioned and needed
law enforcement tool.
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366. United States v. Millan, 2 F.3d 17, 20 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied sub nom.
Bottone v. United States, 510 U.S. 1092 (1994); United States v. Lasanta, 978
F.2d 1300, 1305, (2d Cir. 1992); United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 856 F.2d
1214, 1218 (9th Cir. 1988) (quoting Steven Wisotsky, Crackdown: The Emerging
"Drug Exception" to the Bill oj Rights, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 889 (1987»; United
States v. Levine, 905 F. Supp. 1025, 1032 (M.D. Fla. 1995).

